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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long proclaimed plaintiffs’ Seventh
1
Amendment right to trial by jury to be a “fundamental guarantee of
2
3
the rights and liberties of the people.” Deeming the “justly dear”
4
right “an object of deep interest and solicitude,” the Court has consistently declared that “every encroachment upon it has been watched
5
with great jealousy” and “should be scrutinized with the utmost
6
care.” Given that the right’s “deprivation at the hands of the English
was one of the important grievances leading to the break with Eng7
land,” holding the constitutional right to trial by jury in such high esteem is sensible.
However, civil procedural innovations allegedly sharing a nebulous relationship with the right have pervaded federal courts in recent years. Scholars and litigants have raised concerns that, in practice, many popular procedural innovations—the motion to dismiss,
8
summary judgment, and remittitur among them —preclude affected
*
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Professor Stephen Burbank for their sage advice and keen editorial eyes. I would also like
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U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved . . . .”).
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830), overruled on other grounds, NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id.
Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 378 (1913).
Id.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 734 (2003) (“[R]emittitur in fact does impinge the plaintiff’s
right to a jury trial and is thus unconstitutional.”); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1890 (2008) (“The motion to dismiss is
fast becoming the new summary judgment motion and with this movement, the civil jury
trial continues to disappear.”); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional,
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plaintiffs from exercising their Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury. Two such procedural innovations have come to dominate the
landscape of plaintiffs’ actions: binding individual arbitration under
9
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and multidistrict litigation
(“MDL”). However, their relationships to the trial-by-jury right have
received a modicum of scholarly focus and have gone unaddressed by
the Supreme Court.
Arbitral actions under the FAA have evolved from a dispute resolution method utilized by “sophisticated business entities into a phe10
nomenon that pervades the contemporary economy.” Likewise, the
current volume of MDL in the federal courts is staggering and shows
no sign of abatement, as a third of all pending federal civil cases are
11
part of an MDL. Accordingly, both procedures are more prominent
now than ever before.
Undebatably, both are formally consistent with the Seventh
Amendment’s command that plaintiffs be afforded an opportunity to
be heard by a jury. In FAA-supported arbitration actions, claimants
are thought to be subject to arbitral proceedings and consequently
forfeit their trial-by-jury right only where they knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently consent to do so. Likewise, in MDL, similarly situated plaintiffs asserting comparable legal claims have their pretrial proceedings centralized before one federal district court and are supposedly remanded to their separate courts of origin for individual
trials by jury at the close of MDL’s centralized pretrial proceedings.
However, whether these procedures actually afford plaintiffs an
opportunity to exercise their right to trial by jury in practice is an unexamined, more uncertain prospect. Given that form and practice
are often dissimilar, and that these two procedures dominate contemporary plaintiffs’ actions, the issue cries out for analysis. Accordingly, this Comment evaluates whether FAA-supported arbitration
and MDL are practically consistent with plaintiffs’ abilities to exercise
their right to trial by jury, analyzing the relationship between the substance of the constitutional right, plaintiffs’ practical ability to exercise the right, FAA-supported arbitration, MDL, and the Supreme
Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. This analysis not only

9
10
11

93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139–40 (2007) (“[N]o procedure similar to summary judgment existed under the English common law and . . . summary judgment violates the core principles or ‘substance’ of the English common law.”).
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 201–08, 301–07 (1925).
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of
Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1420 (2008).
See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 762 (2013).
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affords us a glimpse of the on-the-ground realities facing plaintiffs
seeking to exercise their Seventh Amendment right and a comprehensive understanding of the Court’s conception of this right, but,
more importantly, enables us to determine if these procedures have
“relegat[ed] the Seventh Amendment to insignificant words on a
12
page.”
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the FAA-supported
arbitration and MDL processes. Part II sketches the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the trial-by-jury right, explicating its meaning and
application to prospective consumer and mass tort plaintiffs—the
plaintiffs primarily impacted by FAA-supported arbitration and MDL.
Parts III and IV focus on the on-the-ground realities facing prospective consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs, which this Comment argues practically preclude them from exercising their Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury. Part V demonstrates the extraordinarily permissive and formalistic nature of the Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment trial-by-jury jurisprudence, which this Comment
contends is behind the continued vitality of those procedures that are
formally, but not practically, consistent with plaintiffs’ right to trial by
jury. Finally, Part VI, contends that, in light of its prior jurisprudential failings, the Court should resume an active role in the field of
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by affording the constitutional
right an operative, consequential meaning. The Court’s continued
failure to appropriately protect or define the right not only contravenes the aims of the Framers, but also threatens the litigant and societal interests that the Seventh Amendment is thought to protect.
I. THE FAA AND MDL: AN OVERVIEW
A. The FAA
Enacted in 1925 to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to
13
place arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other con-

12

13

Peter A. Arhangelsky, Nullifying the Constitution: Federal Asbestos Tort Reform and the Abrogation of Seventh Amendment Rights, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 121 (2006) (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1989)).
In arbitration, the parties present their case to a presumably neutral third-party decisionmaker rather than to a judge or jury, removing the resolution of the dispute from the
court system altogether. See Brian D. Weber, Contractual Waivers of a Right to Jury Trial—
Another Option, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 717, 726–27 (2006) (explaining arbitration’s mechanics). The arbitrator renders a decision, which is typically final and binding on both parties. See id. at 727 (citing Gregory T. Alvarez & Nancy J. Arencibia, Is Arbitration Right for
Your Company?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1, 2002, at 46). Arbitrators’ decisions are rarely ap-
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tracts,”14 the FAA authorizes federal courts to enter orders to compel
arbitration, suspend judicial proceedings brought by parties opposing
15
arbitration, and enforce arbitration awards. Applicable to contracts,
16
adhesive and otherwise, involving interstate and maritime commerce, the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements within
17
these contracts will be “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,” like any
other valid contractual provision. As scholars began shedding light
on the perceived benefits of arbitration over litigation—primarily arbitration’s propensity to resolve disputes at quicker and cheaper rates
than litigation, diminish the risk of disclosure of confidential information, and preserve the parties’ relationships—Congress passed the
FAA to cement the enforceability of arbitration agreements and
18
combat the judiciary’s hostility toward arbitration.
When it became apparent that the FAA solidified the enforceability of arbitration agreements, corporations responded in kind. In
most of their adhesive consumer contracts, corporations began employing arbitration clauses barring consumers from both resolving

14
15

16

17
18

pealed to a judge and only in a scant few cases where arbitrators engaged in serious misconduct are their decisions overturned. See id. (citing Alvarez & Arencibia, supra).
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474
(1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
See Adam. M. Kepper, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights: Using the Public
Rights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standard of Waiver for Jury-Waiver Clauses Than for Arbitration
Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345, 1352–53 (2006) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–54, 11, 13) (explaining the FAA’s impact on judicial treatment of arbitration clauses).
Adhesive contracts are agreements in which one side has all the bargaining power and
uses it to write the contract to his advantage. See Sierra David Sterkin, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A Consumer’s Guide, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 285–86
(2004) (citing Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1961)) (detailing the characteristics of adhesive contracts). A prime example of an adhesive contract is a standardized contract form that offers services to consumers on an essentially
“take it or leave it” basis without giving consumers realistic opportunities to negotiate
terms to further their interests. See Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221
(N.M. 2008) (citing Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 709 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M. 1985)) (explaining the typical characteristics of adhesive contracts).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 77–78 (2008) (citing Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and
Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 826, 840 (2008)) (discussing the reasons arbitration is favored); Scott R. Swier, The Tenuous Tale of the Terrible
Termites: The Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s Decision to Interpret Section Two in the
Broadest Possible Manner: Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 131, 131 (1996) (“Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act . . . to reverse the
trend of American courts which were, at the time, reluctant to recognize arbitration provisions as legally binding agreements.” (citing Stephen P. Bedell et al., The McMahon
Mandate: Compulsory Arbitration of Securities and RICO Claims, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2–3
(1987))).
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disputes arising out of the contract in the courts and aggregating
19
their claims in arbitration.
In effect, these arbitration agreements—which are known as arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers, respectively, and, thanks
to the FAA, are almost always enforced by the courts—compel affected consumers seeking to resolve a dispute to relinquish the right to
participate in litigation or class-based arbitration. This leaves these
consumers with the sole option of individual arbitration, even when
thousands or millions of claims by similarly situated consumers repli20
cate the individual claim. Accordingly, courts view the “loss of the
right to a jury trial . . . [as] a necessary and fairly obvious conse21
quence of an agreement to arbitrate.”
Corporations’ affinities for arbitration clauses and class arbitration
waivers are unsurprising. Not only do these provisions protect corporations from the temporal, financial, and public relations expenses
attendant to public individual and class-based litigation, but evidence
suggests that—due to a lack of resources or knowledge, or a fear of
retaliation—very few consumers will choose to bring individual arbi22
tration claims against a company. For instance, affidavits submitted
in one recent litigation indicated that “[f]ewer than 200 of [the de19

20

21
22

See Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be Televised, 12 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 669 (2011) (“Once it became clear that these adhesive arbitration clauses would be treated as binding, corporations widely added clauses prohibiting
the aggregation of claims.” (citing Bryan Allen Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
215, 224 (2008))); Robert B. Kershaw, Mandatory Binding Arbitration—Goliath’s New Offense, 36 MD. B.J. 28, 30 (2003) (“[C]orporate parties have widely incorporated mandatory
binding arbitration clauses in virtually every conceivable type of contract that could support a class action claim.”).
See Steven D. Millman, Catching the Waive: The Third Circuit Joins the Growing Trend of Circuit Courts in Voiding a Class-Arbitration Waiver in Homa v. American Express Co., 55 VILL.
L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2010) (“A class-arbitration waiver relinquishes the right to participate
in class-wide arbitration or to aggregate claims with others in any form of . . . arbitral proceeding.” (quoting Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 376 n.15 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191,
1191–92, 1234 (2001) (“In addition to losing consumer rights in arbitration, consumers
lose the traditional remedies that are allowed by the judicial system.” (citing Powertel,
Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999))).
Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984).
See Nicholas Roxborough & Donna Puyot, Dispelling Some Myths About Arbitration, 34 L.A.
LAW. 44, 44 (2011) (“[C]orporations would prefer to have arbitration clauses in boilerplate consumer contracts, in the belief that these clauses result in the more efficient and
less costly resolution of litigation.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704–05 (2012) (discussing the reasons behind corporations’ affinity for arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers).
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fendant’s] millions of customers brought claims in individual arbitration against the company for any reason, compared to thousands who
23
sought help from a consumer group” concerning their claims
against the defendant in that litigation.
Accordingly, today, arbitration clauses containing class arbitration
waivers pervade employment, insurance, and franchise contracts, but
24
are particularly omnipresent in consumer contracts. In fact, more
than seventy-five percent of contemporary consumer contracts have
been found to contain arbitration clauses, usually coupled with class
25
arbitration waivers. Consequently, a substantial majority of prospec26
tive consumer actions are subject to FAA-supported arbitration
27
clauses and class arbitration waivers.
By calling for the enforcement of arbitration agreements, and
thus preventing affected consumers from being heard by a jury, the
FAA’s relationship to the jury trial guarantee is, upon first glance, a
troubled one. As further analysis reveals, a substantial majority of
consumers, by virtue of their subjection to FAA-supported arbitration
clauses and class arbitration waivers, are practically precluded from
ever exercising their right to have their individual or class-based legal
actions heard by a jury. Consequently, the FAA’s relationship to the
jury trial right is a deeply troubled one.

23

24

25
26

27

Sternlight, supra note 22, at 723 (quoting Brief for Marygrace Coneff et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
(No. 09-893), at 9).
See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–83
(2008) (“Over 75% of the consumer agreements we examined included mandatory arbitration clauses.”); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for
Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE
118, 119 (2008) (“[I]n our sample, mandatory arbitration clauses appeared in more than
three-quarters of consumer contracts . . . .”); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty
Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 635 (2008) (“All
nine of the biggest cell phone service providers’ consumer form contracts I examined included [arbitration clauses] . . . . [A]nd all nine of the contracts barred consumers’ access
to class relief.”).
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
These include breach of contract, product-liability-based tort, and unreasonable charges
claims against credit card companies, commercial banks, manufacturers, and service providers.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text; Gilles, supra note 20, at 375 (“[C]ontract-based
class actions are . . . on their way to Mauritius. Corporate caretakers have concocted an
antigen, in the form of the class action waiver provision, that travels through contractual
relationships and dooms the class action device . . . the waiver works in tandem with
standard arbitration provisions to ensure that any claim against the corporate defendant
may be asserted only in a one-on-one, nonaggregated arbitral proceeding.”).
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Although the right to trial by jury is just that—a waivable right and
not a requirement—the courts’ interpretations of the FAA, as detailed in the following sections, call for the enforcement of these arbitration agreements even when plaintiffs’ jury trial waiver is not “know28
ing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Accordingly, the FAA gives ample
cause for serious constitutional concern.
B. The MDL Process
MDL was born out of the sort of massive litigation whose pretrial
proceedings it is aimed at centralizing. In the late 1960s, the federal
government successfully litigated myriad antitrust suits against electrical equipment manufacturers, and, subsequently, more than 1800
separate damages actions were filed against the manufacturers in
29
thirty-three federal district courts. This “unprecedented state of af30
fairs” led legislators and judges to recognize the need for a more efficient means of administering the parallel pretrial proceedings at31
tendant to such massive litigation. Thus, in 1968, § 1407 of Title 28
was enacted, creating the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
32
(“JPML”).
The JPML “is neither a trial, appellate, nor (as some have called
33
it) a . . . ‘Super Court.’” It is a special judicial creature comprised of
seven federal judges empowered to transfer civil actions individually
filed around the country “involving one or more common questions
34
of fact” to a single district court, the transferee court, for coordinated, centralized pretrial proceedings when the transfer would “pro35
mote the just and efficient conduct” of the action.
Formally, MDL only impacts the pretrial stages of plaintiffs’ cases;
by limiting the application of § 1407 to “pretrial proceedings,” Con28
29

30
31

32
33
34
35

Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 732–33 (2001).
See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 31 (1991)
(citing H.R. JUDICIARY COMM., 90TH CONG., REP. NO. 1130, 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899) (detailing MDL’s birth).
Bradt, supra note 11, at 785 (citing DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 2.2
(1986)).
See Bradt, supra note 11, at 785–86 (citing HERR, supra note 30)); George E. Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 159, 159 (1972) (discussing
MDL’s origins); Resnik, supra note 29, at 31–32 (citing Neal & Goldberg, supra note 29, at
623–25) (same).
See Farrell, supra note 31, at 159; Resnik, supra note 29, at 34–35.
Earle F. Kyle, IV, The Mechanics of Motion Practice Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 589, 589 (1998).
Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
Id.
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gress designed JPML to transfer and centralize only those proceed36
ings that precede trial. Accordingly, at the close of pretrial proceedings, individual cases are, in theory, remanded for trial to the districts
37
from which they originated.
The MDL process is most commonly employed to centralize the
pretrial proceedings attendant to “mass torts,” a label referring to
“tortious conduct affecting a large number of persons and giving rise
38
to latent injury.” Since their emergence in 1974, mass torts have become the principal aspect of federal civil litigation; by 1990, they encompassed seventy-five percent of all new federal product liability filings and, by 2000, many jurisdictions reported that mass torts
39
exceeded twenty-five percent of their entire civil caseloads. Consequently, the federal courts—MDL and otherwise—have been flooded
40
with a “rising tide of mass tort filings” ; as Chief Judge Scirica rightly
41
observed, “It’s asbestos. It’s breast implants. It’s fen-phen.”
Securing MDL transfer is not a challenging task for mass tort litigants. MDL’s “common questions of fact” requirement is lax, and, to
authorize transfer, the panel need only find that transfer will “be for
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the
42
just and efficient conduct of such actions.” MDL transfer can be initiated by motion by any party to a litigation, or sua sponte by the
JPML, and the consent of the parties to the litigation is neither re43
quired nor recommended. In fact, MDL transfer may even occur
when all parties agree concerning the merits of transfer, and the

36
37
38

39

40
41
42
43

See Farrell, supra note 31, at 166 (discussing MDL’s design).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action . . . shall be remanded . . . before the conclusion of
such pretrial proceedings . . . .”).
Joseph R. Barton, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 201 (1999)
(citing Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295,
296 n.1 (1996)); See also Bradt, supra note 11, at 762 (“[A] third of all pending federal civil cases are part of an MDL . . . [and] over ninety percent of those cases are [a form of
mass tort] . . . .” (citing Lee et al., supra note 11, at 2)).
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1343, 1363 (1995) (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves:
What’s Going on in the Civil Liability System?, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 139, 147 (1993)) (detailing the
striking proliferation of mass torts); Karen A. Geduldig, Casey at the Bat: Judicial Treatment
of Mass Tort Litigation, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 309–10 (2000) (citing Hensler, supra, at
147) (same).
Michael Higgins, Mass Tort Makeover?, 84 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Bradt, supra note 11, at 786 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407) (detailing the mechanics of MDL transfer).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (discussing methods of transfer).
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JPML may order transfer despite any pertinent infirmities in the par44
ties’ transfer motions and briefs.
Accordingly, although § 1407(a) provides that transfer may only
occur where the JPML decides that transfer will be convenient for the
parties, the JPML conducts transfer hearings with an eye toward judicial economy and efficiency, ordering transfer where doing so would
reduce court dockets and costs, sometimes in the face of opposition
45
by all parties.
More often than not, when faced with a motion for MDL transfer,
or considering one sua sponte, the JPML orders centralization; from
2003 to 2008, for instance, the percentage of cases transferred to an
MDL court of those considered for such transfer ranged from seven46
ty-two to eighty-six percent.
Once a case is transferred, the control of the case is out of the
hands of the JPML and is instead in the control of the transferee
judge, the “MDL judge.” The MDL judge’s authority over pretrial
47
proceedings is quite broad, ranging from coordinating discovery to
48
49
ruling on motions to remand and dispositive motions. Most importantly, the MDL judge has the power to govern the settlement of
50
the cases before it.

44

45

46
47
48
49
50

See Farrell, supra note 31, at 164 (“When consideration is opposed by all the parties, it
should not be required. Occasionally, however, the Panel has taken the opposite position
when plaintiffs and defendants agreed that consolidation was not required . . . .” (citing
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La. (Moisant Field), Docket No. M.D.L.—64
(J.P.M.L. 1971))); Kyle, supra note 33, at 597 n.51, 599–600 (“[T]he Panel may, sua sponte consider and order transfer, despite any infirmities in a brief, or whether a motion or
brief is submitted at all . . . . The Panel considers even unopposed transfer motions on
their merits, and has occasionally denied unopposed transfer motions.” (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(c)(i))).
See Farrell, supra note 31, at 164 (“Occasionally, however, the Panel has [ordered consolidation despite opposition from all parties] . . . .” (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at New
Orleans, La. (Moisant Field), Docket No. M.D.L.—64 (J.P.M.L. 1971))); Kyle, supra note
33, at 590 (“Panel 28 U.S.C. § 1407 transfer orders . . . are meant to achieve efficiency and
judicial economy . . . .” (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 10.1
(1995))).
See John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225,
2229 (2008) (detailing MDL transfer statistics).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 238 F. Supp. 2d
270 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering production of documents at deposition).
See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (resolving motion to remand).
See, e.g., In re Pharmaceutical Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 277
(D. Mass. 2006) (denying motion for summary judgment).
See, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2003)
(“[S]ettlement matters are appropriate pretrial proceedings subject to centralization under [28 U.S.C.] § 1407.” (citing In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 142–44 (3d Cir. 2000))).
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Once part of an MDL, individual plaintiffs retain almost no control over their cases. The MDL judge establishes a Plaintiffs Management Committee (“PMC”) responsible for a range of management functions, such as arguing motions, coordinating discovery, and
51
negotiating settlement. Unsurprisingly, these PMCs often come under fire for exhibiting conflicts of interests and attempting to impose
52
inadequate settlements on plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs before an MDL court are practically out of luck if they
endeavor to escape, as the JPML retains “unusually broad discretion
to carry out its functions, including substantial authority . . . to decide
53
how the cases under its jurisdiction should be coordinated.” Accordingly, appeal of a panel decision to transfer rarely occurs, and is
54
available only by petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.
The idea underlying MDL transfer is a sensible one. If mass torts
are crowding court dockets, then it would “seem sensible to resolve
the claims as efficiently as possible and to reduce the transaction costs
55
in doing so” through transfer. The other appeals of transfer are
clear: thousands of claims can be resolved at once, while incurring
minimal transaction costs, and the resolution of those claims furnishes valuable reference points for the resolutions of other claims as
56
well.
Although more than four decades old, the MDL statute is now
more prominent than ever. A third of all currently pending federal
civil cases are part of an MDL, and more than ninety percent of those
57
cases are a form of mass tort. Many of these MDLs are massive,
comprising thousands of claims and litigants, with billions of dollars

51
52

53
54
55

56

57

See ROBERT L. HAIG, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 14:32
(3d ed. 2012) (discussing PMCs’ functions).
See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Products Liab. Litig., Objectors Claim Settlement a Sham Benefitting Only AHP, Lawyers, 15 NO. 12 ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL LITIG. REP. 12, at *2 (May 2000)
(“The . . . objectors also charge . . . [the PMC and its attorneys] entered into a contract
with AHP beforehand that severely limits how they can represent their clients . . . .”).
In re Wilson, 451 F.3d 161, 173 (3rd Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 811–
12 (3rd Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Heyburn, supra note 46, at 2228–29 (citing In re Wilson, 451 F.3d at 161, 163–64)
(tracing the JPML’s development as a manager of complex litigation disputes).
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation
Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans that Defer Claims Filed by
the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271, 280 (2003).
See id. at 281 (citing The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1283
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 187 (1999) (statement of William N.
Eskridge Jr., Professor, Yale Law School)) (explaining the benefits engendered by MDL).
See Bradt, supra note 11, at 762 (citing Lee et al., supra note 11 (discussing MDL’s role in
contemporary complex litigation).
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in liability claims at stake.58 It is thus no wonder that judges and
scholars deem MDL the “primary vehicle for the resolution of com59
plex civil cases.”
Corresponding temporally with the rise of mass torts and the development of MDL is the last several decades’ marked decline in the
rate of federal tort cases resolved by jury trials: an approximately seventy-eight percent decline between 1985 and 2003, from 3600 to 800
60
federal tort jury trials nationally. Many scholars—who aptly describe
61
62
our civil jury system as “dying” and “all but disappeared” —predict
63
that if this “historic decline” continues, tort jury trials may soon be64
come extinct. This may not disturb those who hail MDL for its noted efficiency and economic benefits, but it is problematic in light of
James Madison’s proclamation that “[t]rial by jury in civil cases
65
is . . . essential to secure the liberty of the people.” As explained in
the following sections, mass tort MDL plaintiffs have been afforded a
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury that, in practice, the MDL
process precludes them from exercising.

58

59
60

61

62
63

64

65

See Charles Silver & Geoffrey C. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 108 (2010) (“[T]he biggest
[MDLs] involv[e] tens of thousands of plaintiffs with billions of dollars in liability claims.”
(citing In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3rd Cir. 2002))).
Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324
(2008) (citing In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
See ALAN KANNER, DAUBERT AND THE DISAPPEARING JURY TRIAL 38 (2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1851 (citing Leonard Post, Federal Tort Trials Continue Downward Spiral, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 22, 2005, at 7) (noting the decline of federal jury
trials).
Justice Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.
191, 192 (2005) (quoting William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED.
LAW., July 2003, at *32 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 142 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.? Can it Actually Happen in America?, 40 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 795, 812 (2009) (quoting Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 797 (“If the trend continues . . . civil jury trials in America may eventually
become, for all practical purposes, extinct.”); Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 693 (2005) (“[C]ivil jury trials are basically
dead . . . .”).
Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 307 (2005)
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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II. THE MEANING AND APPLICATION OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT’S
TRIAL-BY-JURY GUARANTEE
A. The Meaning of the Seventh Amendment
Valued for its emphasis on common sense, empowerment of the
common people, and check upon the power of the sovereign and the
judge, the jury trial right has been recognized as a critical aspect of
66
our governmental structure since the Founding. As Justice Story
famously proclaimed, “[the right of trial by jury] . . . is . . . the palla67
dium of our public rights and liberties.” This principle still rings
true today; as the Seventh Circuit recently explained, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of American law that every person is entitled to
68
his or her day in court.”
Although we have scant direct evidence concerning the intention
of the Framers of the Seventh Amendment, the founding generation
69
clearly intended for us to “do justice with juries.” When Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence, he “observed that a
‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind’ required those in rebellion to ‘declare the causes’ that impelled them to separation, includ70
ing England’s ‘depriving us . . . of the benefits of Trial by Jury.’”
When Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, he likewise centered it
around jury trials in civil cases, resulting in the Seventh Amend71
ment.
Outwardly, the Court has maintained the Seventh Amendment’s
importance, proclaiming it to be “of such importance and [to] occup[y] so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized
72
with the utmost care.” To date, however, the Court has “artfully
avoided any pronouncement of what substantive jury functions are

66

67

68
69
70
71
72

See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 865 (2008) (“In civil cases, the preservation of the
jury right was viewed at the time of the founding as almost equally critical to the preservation of liberty and democracy.” (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1762 (1833))).
Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 687 (2004) (quoting John C. Hogan, Joseph Story on Juries, 37 OR. L.
REV. 234, 249 (1958)).
Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998).
Furgeson, supra note 63, at 798.
See id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 20 (U.S. 1776)).
See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
Arhangelsky, supra note 12, at 98 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt , 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
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‘preserved’”73 by the constitutional right to trial by jury in civil cases.
The Court’s scant holdings regarding jury functions have thus far
spoken exclusively to procedure: disputed questions of fact must be
74
75
submitted to the jury; unanimity of verdict is required; the jury
76
must be so constituted as to be an impartial and competent tribunal;
77
and a jury of six is constitutionally permissible.
Nonetheless, despite its evasiveness in the area of substantive jury
functions, the Court has established a historical approach through
which it not only evaluates the constitutionality of a procedure implicating the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee, but also determines
78
whether an action affords plaintiffs a right to a jury trial.
Because the “common law” referenced in the Seventh Amendment refers to the common law of England in 1791, the year the Seventh Amendment was enacted, a new procedure affecting the jury
trial right will be constitutional under the Seventh Amendment only
if the procedure satisfies the “substance” of the “English common law
79
when the Amendment was adopted.” The Court’s explication of the
substance of the English common law jury trial in 1791 is sparse: “issues of law are to be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be
80
determined by the jury . . . .” Accordingly, this proclamation is our
sole tool for defining the substance of the English common law jury
trial and, consequently, the Seventh Amendment’s substantive requirements.
The Court’s historical approach only calls for the preservation of
the substance of the common law jury trial, not “mere matters of
81
form or procedure.” Thus, new procedural modifications to the jury
trial are permissible so long as they leave intact the substance of the
82
English common law trial. Under this approach, the Court has up73
74
75
76
77
78

79
80
81
82

Paul B. Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH.
U. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989).
See id. (citing Baylis v. Travellers’ Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 320–21 (1885)).
See id. (citing Am. Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897)).
See Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial By Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV.
669, 674 (1918) (detailing the substance of the Seventh Amendment trial-by-jury right).
See Weiss, supra note 73 (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973)).
See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 344 (“[T]he content of the right
must be judged by historical standards.”) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193
(1974)).
Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
Id. (citing Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897)).
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 346 (citing Balt. & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 657).
See id. (“[T]o sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the province of the jury
to a greater degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct contravention of
the Seventh Amendment.” (citing Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322
(1967))).
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held many procedural innovations without controversy: directed ver83
84
dicts, partial new trials on separable legal issues, judgments not85
86
withstanding the verdict, and summary judgment.
Finally, under this approach, a modern plaintiff is guaranteed a
jury trial if the plaintiff’s claim would have been actionable, or is
87
analogous to a claim that would have been, in a 1791 English com88
mon law court. Courts refer to such jury-right-affording actions as
89
actions “at law.” An action was one “at law” in 1791 if it was one “in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra90
distinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized.”
Importantly, when an action is one purely for monetary damages—
which are, by definition, “legal” damages—the action is always one at
law and, therefore, “the determination of damages must fall to a ju91
ry.”
B. Prospective Consumer and Mass Tort MDL Plaintiffs Retain a Seventh
Amendment Right to Trial by Jury
Under this prevailing historical approach, the Seventh Amendment clearly guarantees prospective consumer and individual mass
tort MDL plaintiffs the right to a jury trial. Each of these plaintiffs is
asserting, or seeking to assert, a basic contract or tort claim against
the defendant for monetary damages, and juries were impaneled for
such actions at common law in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment
was enacted.

83
84
85
86
87

88

89
90
91

See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (holding that directed verdict is consistent with the Seventh Amendment).
See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (upholding the
partial new trial on a separable legal issue against a Seventh Amendment challenge).
See Balt. & Carolina Line, 295 U.S. at 654 (holding that judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is constitutional under a Seventh Amendment analysis).
See Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902) (holding that summary judgment is consistent with the Seventh Amendment).
The Court has neglected to explain what, exactly, it deems a claim “analogous” to one at
common law. However, in making this determination, the Court focuses on “the nature
of the issue to be tried.” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (citing Simler v.
Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963)).
See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (“By common law . . . [the Framers] meant . . . suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those . . . [in which] equitable remedies were administered . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 43 (1989).
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974) (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447).
Arhangelsky, supra note 12, at 114 (citing Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991)).
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Contract-law-based legal actions for monetary damages tried be92
fore juries were ubiquitous at common law. Identifying a common
law legal cause of action identical or analogous to the contract law
claims seeking monetary damages asserted by nearly all prospective
consumer plaintiffs is therefore an unchallenging task. Accordingly,
prospective consumer plaintiffs asserting contract-based actions for
monetary damages retain a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.
Given that the origin of trial by jury of tort actions for monetary
damages against private parties at English common law dates to as
early as the fifteenth century, such tort actions, too, were ubiquitous
93
in the English common law court system. Consequently, finding a
common law legal cause of action identical or analogous to the claims
asserted by mass tort MDL plaintiffs and many prospective consumer
plaintiffs subject to the FAA, as the historical approach mandates, is
easily realized: mass tort MDL and many consumer plaintiffs are
94
likewise seeking to assert tort claims for monetary damages.
The fact that the class action device alters the form in which many
individual prospective consumer plaintiffs would ultimately arrive before a jury has no effect on the underlying legal action’s nature as
one sounding in contract or, at times, tort for monetary relief and, as
a result, garnering Seventh Amendment protection. Likewise, that
MDL alters the way mass tort plaintiffs would ultimately arrive before
a jury does not modify the underlying nature of the legal action as
one sounding in tort for monetary relief and, consequently, receiving
Seventh Amendment protection. The Court has consistently held
that “nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by which the parties happen to come before the
95
court.” Accordingly, regardless of the procedural innovation being
employed, where the underlying actions are legal, the Seventh
96
Amendment affords the plaintiffs a right to trial by jury. Thus, by
92

93
94

95
96

See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims Action, 25 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 361, 376 n.88 (1992) (citing JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 285–87 (2d ed. 1979)) (explaining why plaintiffs asserting contractual actions for monetary damages retain a Seventh Amendment right).
See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASE AND
MATERIALS 1–5 (10th ed. 2000) (detailing the origins of tort actions).
See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 311 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]ort actions for
monetary damages are a prototypical example of an action at law, to which the Seventh
Amendment applies.” (quoting Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 112) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970).
See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 311 (“[C]lass action plaintiffs may obtain a jury trial on any legal
issues they present . . . .” (quoting Ross, 396 U.S. at 541) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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virtue of their assertion of legal claims, mass tort MDL plaintiffs and
prospective consumer plaintiffs retain a constitutional right to trial by
jury.
The Court has not yet decided a case concerning the relationship
between the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee, the impact of these FAA-supported, adhesive arbitration clauses and class
arbitration waivers, and MDL. Nonetheless, the on-the-ground, practical realities detailed in the following two Parts suggest that the
Court recognize that each of these procedural innovations precludes
affected plaintiffs from exercising their Seventh Amendment right to
trial by jury.
III. THE JUDICIARY’S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA
PRECLUDES PROSPECTIVE CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS FROM EXERCISING
THEIR TRIAL-BY-JURY RIGHT
The FAA’s support for adhesive arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers is formally consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s
jury trial guarantee. However, practically, the federal courts’ interpretations of the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate places adhesive arbitration agreements, arbitration clauses, and class arbitration waivers
97
alike, not “upon the same footing as other contracts,” but on sacrosanct grounds, enabling corporations to use these agreements to bar
consumers from accessing the courts. The courts’ jurisprudence
concerning arbitration agreements illustrates that the courts not only
98
abide by a sweeping “federal policy favoring arbitration,” but they
seek to enforce arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers regardless of the specific characteristics of each contract. The language
or placement of adhesive arbitration agreements, consumers’ degrees
of knowledge, education, or sophistication, corporations’ coercive or
fraudulent tactics in procuring consumers’ consent to these clauses,
and whether consumers knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently
agreed to such clauses all drop by the wayside.
This empowers corporations to, as they do in most of their con99
sumer contracts, employ powerful adhesive arbitration agreements
explicitly locking consumers into individual arbitration, producing
the “reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her consti97

98
99

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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tutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a
car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical atten100
The striking proliferation of these courttion or gets a job.”
enforced arbitration agreements has rightly prompted scholars to
acknowledge the resultant “paradigmatic shift in our civil justice sys101
tem” away from the civil jury trial. Today, the widespread use of
these adhesive arbitration agreements effectively compels a consumer
to “yield his or her very access to the courts in order to meaningfully
102
participate in our modern society.”
While these adhesive arbitration agreements are said to be justified on the ground that consumers knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently consent to them, such a justification is not grounded in reali103
Consumers have no real opportunity to choose litigation over
ty.
arbitration if they want the often commonplace product or service in
question.
Corporations’ propensity to employ such arbitration agreements
is unsurprising. These arbitration agreements align perfectly with
their interests; data show that “blindly agreeing to contract provisions
104
is a behavior routinely exhibited by the average consumer,” and evidence suggests that—due to a lack of resources and awareness and
fear of retaliation—“very few consumers will choose to bring individ105
ual arbitration claims against a company.” Relatedly, corporations
are fully cognizant of the courts’ extraordinary deference toward ad106
Corporate lawyers and business exhesive arbitration agreements.

100
101

102
103

104
105
106

Sternlight, supra note 28, at 669 (citing In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1999)).
Judge Craig Smith & Judge Eric Moye, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 282
(2012).
Id. (citing Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, The State of the Judiciary in Texas, 70 TEX. B.J.
314, 315 (Apr. 2007)).
See Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 1997), rejected by Ex parte Perry,
744 So. 2d 859, 865 (Ala. 1999) (“[An] arbitration agreement is a waiver of a party’s right
under the Amendment VII of the United States Constitution to a jury trial and, regardless
of the federal courts’ policy favoring arbitration, we find nothing in the FAA that would
permit such waiver unless it is made knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily.”); Jean R.
Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1997) (“[C]onsumers and employees are given no real opportunity to choose
litigation or other dispute-resolution techniques over arbitration.”).
Millman, supra note 20, at 1033 n.1 (citing David. W. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971)).
Sternlight, supra note 22, at 723.
See Gilles, supra note 20, at 395–96 (citing Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7116
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005)); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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ecutives have long been known to regularly share their tactical insights concerning the successes of arbitration agreements “in trade
107
journals, at conferences, and in high-level planning sessions.”
The rise of this reality has been sped along by the Court’s juris108
prudence in support of its “federal policy favoring arbitration.”
Crucially, this jurisprudence has been emphatically enforced by lower
courts, which construe defenses to agreements to arbitrate particularly narrowly, interpret arbitration agreements especially broadly, and
regularly mandate individual arbitration in new areas. These lower
courts have also felt free to strike state consumer protection statutes
and disregard the specific conditions of these adhesive arbitration
agreements: consumers’ degrees of knowledge and sophistication;
the clauses’ clarity and conspicuousness; corporate defendants’ coercive or fraudulent tactics in procuring consumers’ “consent” to these
clauses; and whether consumers agreed to such clauses knowingly,
voluntarily, or intelligently.
A. The Supreme Court’s Policy Favoring Arbitration over Litigation
In 1983, the Supreme Court enunciated a sweeping preference
for binding arbitration over litigation, supporting and effectively expanding adhesive arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers and
109
The lower courts’ enforcetheir enforcement, scope, and impact.
ment of this policy, as detailed in the following section, locks affected
consumers into binding individual arbitration, precluding them from
110
securing a trial by jury, individually or as a class.
The Court’s policy favoring arbitration over litigation stems from
its proclamation in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. concerning the FAA:

107

108
109
110

593, 617–18 (2005)) (explaining corporations’ awareness of these agreements and the
subsequent growth of “an ADR cottage industry”).
See id. (“Buoyed by this extraordinary judicial deference, corporate lawyers and business
executives naturally sought ways to expand the reach of arbitration clauses, sharing their
tactical insights in trade journals, at conferences, and in high-level, top-secret planning
sessions.” (citing Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7116)).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
See id.
Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 17 (2003) (“The civil jury trial is fast disappearing from our legal
landscape, and one important reason for its disappearance is the rapid growth of mandatory arbitration.” (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, JUDICIAL STATISTICAL
INQUIRY FORM, http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last visited May 2,
2013))).
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[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
111
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.

Pursuant to this “federal policy favoring arbitration,”112 the Court
113
interprets defenses to agreements to arbitrate particularly narrowly,
interprets arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers especially
114
broadly, and regularly expands the reach and impact of arbitration
clauses and waivers by mandating individual arbitration in areas pre115
viously thought to be within the exclusive domain of litigation. Although the Court has not expressly stated that binding arbitration can
apply to all federal court claims, scholars have recognized that this
preference for arbitration over litigation “often has the same ef116
fect.”
The Court recently furthered its policy favoring arbitration by significantly broadening the applicability of corporations’ class arbitration waivers. In 2011’s AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court
held that the FAA preempts state laws that would hold adhesive con117
tracts’ class arbitration waivers to be unenforceable.
As would be typical of such state laws, the state law at issue in Concepcion classified class arbitration waivers contained in adhesive consumer contracts as unconscionable because a state legislature determined that such waivers so effectively insulated companies from classbased claims that they cheated large numbers of consumers out of
118
individually small sums of money. Nonetheless, the Court, invoking
119
its “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” held that the FAA
preempts such state laws, as they “stan[d] as an obstacle to [the
120
FAA’s] accomplishment and execution.”
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25 (citing Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643
(7th Cir. 1981)). The Court has neglected to explain this policy or its rationale.
Id. at 24.
See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 697 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25).
See id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)).
See id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
Sternlight, supra note 103, at 77 .
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Sternlight, supra note 22,
at 705–06 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748–53) (explaining Concepcion).
See Sternlight, supra note 22, at 705 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th
148, 162–63 (2005)).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1756 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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In the aftermath of Concepcion’s striking of such pro-consumer
state laws, scholars expect, and are seeing, even more companies incorporating arbitration clauses containing class arbitration waivers in
their adhesive consumer contracts, as “[c]hallenges to [these] waivers
based on state statutory or common law will likely face greater diffi121
culty navigating the Court’s Concepcion decision.”
Consequently, for its support and expansion of adhesive contracts’
arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers and their enforcement, scope, and impact, the Court’s policy favoring arbitration over
litigation goes a measurable way toward permitting corporate and
commercial entities to use adhesive, FAA-supported arbitration
agreements to preclude consumer plaintiffs from being heard before
a jury. However, as detailed below, it is the federal courts’ emphatic
enforcement of this policy and the Concepcion decision that is primarily responsible for the inability of present-day consumers to exercise
their constitutional right to be heard by a jury.
B. The Federal Courts’ Emphatic Response to the Court’s Policy Favoring
Arbitration
In response to the Court’s sweeping policy preference for arbitration over litigation, the federal courts have reacted emphatically. Not
only have they followed suit by likewise narrowly interpreting defens122
123
es to arbitration, broadly interpreting arbitration clauses, and
124
mandating arbitration in a wide array of new areas, but they have
actually gone further.
Guided by their expansive interpretation of the Court’s policy favoring arbitration, the federal courts almost always disregard the language and placement of arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers as well as the parties’ degrees of knowledge, sophistication, and
education to conclude that an arbitration clause was sufficiently clear
125
and conspicuous to constitute a valid, binding agreement. For example, the federal courts routinely uphold confusingly worded and
buried arbitration agreements that fail to inform consumers that by
121
122
123
124
125

Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1218 (2012).
See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 697–98 (citing Ex parte Smith, 736 So. 2d 604, 610 (Ala.
1999)).
See id. at 697 (citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1996)).
See id. at 698 (citing Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 763, 767 (10th Cir. 2000)).
See Sternlight, supra note 103, at 26 (citing Scher v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., 723 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (discussing the courts’ noteworthy interpretation of the Court’s policy favoring arbitration).
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accepting arbitration, they have waived their right to trial by jury,126
and insist that “typical investors, senior citizens, and consumers are
all sufficiently knowledgeable to understand the significance
127
of . . . arbitration provision[s].” Some courts have even gone so far
as to enforce arbitration agreements where the contract signed did
not refer to arbitration, but merely incorporated it by reference to
128
another, separate document that called for arbitration.
Accordingly, this disregard for the clauses’ clarity and conspicuousness has led the courts to enforce legalese-filled, inconspicuous,
“envelope-stuffer” amendments to adhesion contracts—“for example,
the unread notice stuffed in a consumer’s monthly bill stating that, by
continuing to use her credit card, or her telephone, she agrees to ar129
bitrate any dispute that may arise.” Increasingly, and disturbingly,
these notices containing arbitration clauses and class arbitration
waivers are taking the form of mass e-mails or Web site postings, and
130
the courts have seemingly had no qualms about enforcing them.
As a consequence of corporations’ awareness of the courts’ lack of
concern for arbitration agreements’ clarity or conspicuousness, arbitration clauses’ and class arbitration waivers’ prohibitive language is
now usually “buried between the fine print and legalese,” leaving
consumers “unable to recognize that they have entered into an
agreement that effectively waives their right to bring a class action or
131
adjudicate the issue in anything other than an arbitral forum.
Additionally, the courts regularly enforce coercive and fraudulently procured agreements containing arbitration clauses and class arbi132
tration waivers. For instance, the courts have been so willing to enforce agreements to arbitrate that they have upheld the imposition of
arbitration where a company verbally misled consumers regarding
the provision, such as where a company’s agent falsely stated that

126
127
128
129
130
131
132

See id. at 26–27 (citing Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
Id. at 27 (citing McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C94-0627 FMS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10122, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1994)).
See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 701 (citing R.J. O’Brien & Assoc., Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d
257, 260 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Gilles, supra note 20, at 377.
See id. (citing Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 919 (N.D. Tex. 2000)).
Christina Johnson, Employment and Consumer Arbitration Agreements: Does It Limit Your Ability to Bring or Participate in a Class Action?, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 273, 277 (2010).
See Sternlight, supra note 116, at 26 (“[R]ather than admit that an arbitration agreement
is unclear, fraudulent, coercive or unfair, courts have often engaged in highly formalistic
analyses that essentially reject reality and factual distinctions in favor of this mythical vision.”)
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signing the arbitration clause would not compromise any rights.133
The courts have likewise enforced arbitration agreements even where
company representatives lulled consumers into signing the clause by
134
stating that the clause was a “mere formality.”
Such extraordinary deference to arbitration agreements has become pervasive among the federal courts, prompting scholars to
rightly recognize that “[r]ather than admit an arbitration agreement
is . . . fraudulent, coercive, or unfair, courts have often engaged in
highly formalistic analyses that essentially reject reality and factual
135
distinctions in favor of this mythical version.”
Moreover, guided by their expansive interpretation of the Court’s
policy favoring arbitration, the federal courts do not require that adhesive arbitration clauses or class arbitration waivers be entered into
136
permitting “the pro“knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently,”
137
arbitration policy . . . [to] trum[p] [these] considerations.” Not only is this inequitable, but this approach conflicts with the prevailing
standard for permissive waivers of the right to trial by jury, which
mandates that the parties knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
138
waive their right to trial by jury.
For example, courts typically do not even consider whether an arbitration agreement was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, or intel139
ligently. Instead, they apply standard “objective” rules for contract
formation, holding that arbitration-clause-containing “adhesive contracts are valid, so long as they are not unconscionable, fraudulent,
140
obtained under duress, or otherwise invalid.” In an especially tell133
134
135
136

137

138

139
140

See id. at 31 (citing Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir.
1988)).
Id. (quoting Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. DeFries, No. 94-Civ. 0020 (WK), 1994 WL
455178, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1994)).
Id. at 26.
Sternlight, supra note 28, at 699 (citing Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
195, 197 (1998)).
Nima H. Mohebbi, Back Door Arbitration: Why Allowing Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize Arbitration Clauses May Violate the Seventh Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 555, 557 (2010), (citing Realty Trust Grp., Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., Civil No. 1:07CV573-HSO-JMR, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91331, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007)).
See Deborah J. Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial
Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 449 (1997) (citing Nat’l Equipment
Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977)) (detailing this prevailing standard
for jury trial waivers). Though the Supreme Court has never enunciated the precise
standard courts should employ in reviewing contractual jury trial waivers, the lower courts
have virtually uniformly followed Hendrix. See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 678 (citing
Hendrix, 565 F.2d at 258).
See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 699 (citing Ware, supra note 136, at 197).
Id. (citing Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286–88 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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ing case illustrating the court’s disregard for the jury trial waiver requirements, the Seventh Circuit held that an unaware broker had
voluntarily and knowingly accepted arbitration by virtue of one of his
business dealings, reasoning that he could have chosen a different
141
business endeavor if he did not want to arbitrate.
In those few cases in which the federal courts evaluated whether
plaintiffs should be compelled to engage in individual arbitration and
relinquish their constitutional rights to trial by jury despite their not
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently agreeing to do so, a few courts
recognized that a contract to arbitrate necessarily waives the jury trial
right. However, the federal courts neglected to explain their failure
to apply the traditional jury trial waiver criteria to determine whether
142
Some federal courts
or not permissible waiver should be found.
have implicitly acknowledged the conflict between consumers’ unknowing, involuntarily, or unintelligent consent to arbitration
agreements and the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, but
disregarded it, summarily stating that arbitration is “favored” by the
143
Finally, other federal
Court and its interpretation of the FAA.
courts have disappointingly asserted that “by ‘agreeing’ to arbitrate,”
plaintiffs consented “to have their dispute resolved in a non-Seventh
Amendment forum, and that the court therefore need not apply
144
normal waiver criteria.”
Consequently, the federal courts’ stark refusal to properly mandate that adhesive arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers be
entered into knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently in order to be enforced has prompted scholars to recognize that consumers “often do
not knowingly or intelligently waive their right to a jury trial when
145
they are forced to arbitrate under the FAA.”
Lastly, in the wake of Concepcion, and in line with the Court’s policy favoring arbitration, the federal courts are not only liberally striking consumer protection laws condemning class arbitration waivers in
adhesive contracts, but are, more importantly, extending Concepcion’s
reasoning to contexts not discussed or explicitly considered by the

141
142
143
144
145

See Sternlight, supra note 103, at 33 (citing Geldermann v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, 836 F.2d 310, 317–18 (7th Cir. 1987)).
See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 675–76 (citing Dillard v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992)).
See id. at 676 (citing Cohen, 841 F.2d at 285, 287).
Id. (citing Illyes v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 949 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).
Mohebbi, supra note 137, at 557 (citing Sternlight, supra note 103, at 7) (emphasis added).
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Court.146 For instance, the courts have relied upon Concepcion to reject arguments that denying plaintiffs their class actions would violate
147
state law or public policy, that class arbitration waivers prevent
148
plaintiffs from vindicating their rights under state law, and that class
arbitration waivers are not applicable as to claims for public injunc149
tive relief brought under state law. Many courts have even applied
Concepcion retroactively, permitting defendants that are currently litigating to oppose continued litigation by raising an arbitration defense, reasoning that Concepcion’s dramatic change in the law voids
150
plaintiffs’ claims that defendants waived the arbitral defense.
The federal courts’ expansive interpretation of Concepcion is truly
“proving to be a tsunami that is wiping out existing and potential
151
Relatedly, if plaintiff consumers “canconsumer . . . class actions.”
not join together as a class, lack of knowledge, lack of resources, and
fear of retaliation will prevent them from bringing any claims at
152
all.” For its impediment to consumers’ ability to be heard before a
jury as a class, scholars have recognized that Concepcion and the federal courts’ expansive interpretation of the decision permits “companies to use arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class actions,” thereby “provid[ing] companies with free rein to commit
fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of
153
being sued.”
Accordingly, the federal courts’ expansive implementation of the
Court’s policy favoring arbitration and the Conception decision has
morphed the class arbitration waiver into, as Professor Gilles explained, a corporate antigen, one that effectively travels through consumers’ contractual relationships and, with the help of the arbitration
154
clause, dooms consumer plaintiffs’ right to trial by jury prospects.
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

154

See Sternlight, supra note 22, at 709 (“[J]udges are extending Concepcion’s reasoning to
contexts not directly discussed by the Court.”).
See id. at 710 (citing Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C 07-00411, 2011 WL 4381748,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)).
See id. (citing Kaltwasser, 2011 WL 4381748, at *4–7).
See id. (citing Meyer v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05858 CRB, 2011 WL 4434810 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 2011)).
See id. at 711 (citing Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL
3419499 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011)).
Id. at 704.
See id. at 704–05.
Id. at 704 (citing Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to
Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-ofrights/).
See Gilles, supra note 20, at 375–76 (explaining arbitration agreements’ function as a jury
trial “antigen”).
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Consequently, consumers subject to such arbitration agreements, a
155
majority of consumers, are locked into individual, binding arbitration and are resultantly precluded from exercising their constitutional right to trial by jury.
IV. MDL PRECLUDES MASS TORT PLAINTIFFS FROM EXERCISING THEIR
TRIAL-BY-JURY RIGHT
Despite its formal consistency with the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee, analysis indicates that the MDL process impels
mass tort plaintiffs to accept pretrial settlement, precluding them
from being heard by a jury. Although precise statistics concerning
MDL claim resolution are unavailable, it is certain that only a small
percentage of actions are remanded for individual jury trials, as virtu156
ally all are induced to settle. Accordingly, as many litigants have argued in recent years, settlement is the only realistic option for the
157
resolution of MDL claims.
In enacting the MDL statute, Congress clearly prioritized efficiency and economy over individual convenience and rights: the goal
and effect of MDL is clearly to produce settlements with low transac158
However, in attempting to realize this goal, legislators
tion costs.
and the courts have unjustly promoted such efficiency over mass tort
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to trial by jury. In the name of this efficiency, the JPML commonly orders MDL transfer of mass tort actions involving one or more issues of common fact—sua sponte, or at
the behest of a commercial defendant who is aware that MDL creates
159
“the perfect conditions for an aggregate settlement,” and often over

155
156

157

158

159

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See Barton, supra note 38, at 210 (“[O]nly a small percentage of actions are remanded.”
(citing Shawn Copeland et al., Toxic Tort and Environmental Matters: Civil Litigation, 64
ALI-ABA 33, 40 (1998))); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
576, 593 (2008) (“[S]ettlement is currently the only realistic option for collective resolution of mass claims . . . .”).
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate at *8, Hayford v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., No. 08CV01479 (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 7853952 (“[T]he interminable delay wrought by transfer to the MDL . . . effectively denies the plaintiffs their
rights to trial by jury.”).
See Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing Multidistrict Litigation from the Altar of Expediency, 1997
B.Y.U. L. REV. 821, 833 (1997) (“[I]n enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Congress chose to allow
judicial efficiency to outweigh individual convenience . . . .” (citing Robert H. Trangsrud,
Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 809 (1985))).
Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
265, 270 (2011).
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plaintiffs’ objections—locking mass tort plaintiffs into a process that
160
compels them to relinquish their trial-by-jury rights.
Three factors conspire to preclude mass tort MDL plaintiffs from
securing a post-MDL trial by jury: the prohibitive temporal and financial costs imposed on MDL plaintiffs, particularly those not engaged in contingency fee arrangements; the “settlement or nothing”
approach adhered to by federal judges; and the inducement of set161
tlement by bellwether trials.
A. MDL Imposes Preclusive Costs on Mass Tort Plaintiffs
Post-MDL trial by jury is practically unavailable to mass tort MDL
plaintiffs. The temporal costs imposed on plaintiffs by the MDL process, which are far more extreme than the typical temporal problems
plaintiffs encounter in dealing with an overworked judicial system, effectively preclude these plaintiffs from securing a post-MDL trial by
jury, compelling them to pursue pretrial settlement.
Partly due to the necessity to gear MDL proceedings to the “slow162
est common denominator,” MDL pretrial preparation time follow163
ing transfer is regularly delayed and incredibly long, commonly ex164
165
ceeding two years and often taking nearly a decade. MDL courts
166
consistently take several years to conduct discovery alone.
167
Remand for trial is truly an “empty dream” for many mass tort
MDL plaintiffs—but particularly asbestos plaintiffs—unlucky enough
to have their cases transferred to an MDL court. One district court
recently noted that, if a case is transferred to a particular MDL, “the
168
Courts have likewise
matter will likely be substantially delayed.”
160

161
162
163

164
165
166
167
168

See supra note 156 and accompanying text; Farrell, supra note 31, at 163 (explaining that
the JPML “seldom” transfers cases to an MDL court based on considerations pertinent to
the individual plaintiffs).
Bellwethers are carefully selected, illustrative test trials involving facts and legal issues similar to those facing MDL litigants.
Farrell, supra note 31, at 159 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincinnati Airport
(Constance, Ky.) on Nov. 8, 1965, Docket No. M.D.L.—8A (J.P.M.L. 1965)).
See Geduldig, supra note 39, at 310 (“[Mass tort MDL] litigation is invariably delayed and
claims are often left unresolved.” (citing Linda S. Mullenix, High Court Should Review Mass
Torts, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 7, 1996, at A19)).
See Robert Sayler & William Skinner, Legal Lore the Mother of All Battles: The Quest for Asbestos Insurance Coverage, 27 LITIG. , no. 1, 45 (detailing a four-year-long MDL proceeding).
See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 434 (1986)
(“[C]ases pending eight years still have not been heard.”).
See Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, 24 LITIG., no. 4, 43, 44
(1998) (“[D]iscovery will not be completed for months or years.”).
Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate, supra note 157, at 3.
Hilbert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (D. Mass. 2008).
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recognized that transfer to an asbestos MDL may result in the plain169
tiff “not [being] heard for many years” and will force the plaintiff to
170
In reference to a
“languish[] for a protracted period of time.”
popular asbestos MDL, another district court aptly recognized that no
“trials or discovery takes place in deference to global settlement ef171
forts.”
The prospect of engaging in a protracted trial following years of
such time-consuming MDL proceedings is simply not an option for
many plaintiffs. MDL plaintiffs are commonly ill and need monetary
relief soon. Their lives very often depend on it, literally, so they likely
lack years to wait for the initiation and completion of a trial following
172
the already lengthy pretrial MDL process. Scholars have noted the
“real concern that many [mass tort MDL] plaintiffs will die before
they are compensated and a great many will wait years for their
173
Many attorneys who represent asbestos MDL plaintiffs
awards.”
have voiced concern that “current trends in the [MDL] threaten
174
The situation concerning asbestos is
payments to the truly sick.”
not unique, as the MDL involving breast implants and Dalkon Shield,
a contraceptive intrauterine device, imposed comparable delays on
175
plaintiffs, raising similar concerns.
Consequently, for many mass tort MDL plaintiffs, the temporal
costs of a jury trial following the years spent languishing in the MDL
court are preclusive of their ability to exercise their right to trial by
jury.
The financial costs engendered by pretrial MDL proceedings are
likewise extremely high, forcing the substantial number of individual
plaintiffs who do not retain counsel under a contingency fee arrangement—such as the many plaintiffs compensating counsel at an

169
170
171
172

173
174
175

Madden v. Able Supply Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
Rosamond v. Garlock Sealing Techs., Inc., No. 3:03CV235, 2004 WL 943924, at *4 (N.D.
Miss. Apr. 5, 2004).
In re Me. Asbestos Cases, 44 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 n.2 (D. Me. 1999).
See Barton, supra note 38, at 203 (citing 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2, 34–35 (Mar. 1991)) (“The
asbestos litigation produced the real and present danger that transaction costs would exhaust available assets before plaintiffs could collect for judgments, if obtained.”).
Id. (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 141 (1995)).
Schwartz et al., supra note 55, at 274 (citing Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some Million Dollar
Lungs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 36, available at 2001 WL 30366341).
See Higgins, supra note 40, at 53 (“[M]ass torts are the legal system’s version of a nuclear
exchange: Thousands of complex claims. Huge potential damages. Massive discovery
and expense. The litigation over silicone breast implants has been all of that and
more . . . for every dollar the plaintiffs finally recover, experts estimate that litigation expenses will have eaten up another 60 to 75 cents . . . .”).

260

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:1

hourly rate—to settle their claims and skip an expensive post-MDL
176
These plaintiffs, many of whom simultaneously face steep
trial.
177
medical bills, are thus effectively prohibited from pursuing post178
This is news to
MDL jury trial by MDL proceedings’ sizable costs.
no one, as judges have long acknowledged MDL pretrial proceedings’
179
prohibitive costs, particularly in the asbestos realm.
The exorbitant expense of MDL proceedings engenders “the real
180
and present danger that transaction costs w[ill] exhaust” the parties’ funds, forcing them into bankruptcy and stifling litigation. In
fact, those few successful mass tort plaintiffs expend nearly twice the
amount they recover on consolidated pretrial proceeding transaction
costs, sending a clear signal to other mass tort plaintiffs to seek an
economical resolution in the form of a convenient, net-positive set181
Much of this stems from the expenses associated with
tlement.
MDL’s particularly protracted discovery proceedings; in MDL, it is
176

177

178
179

180
181

See ROXANNE BARTON CONLIN & GREGORY S. CUSIMANO, 1 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 8:31
(2012) (noting that some mass tort plaintiffs compensate their attorneys at an hourly
rate, and “[w]here counsel are compensated based on an hourly rate, the expenses associated with MDL practice are ultimately passed on to the client”); Farrell, supra note 31,
at 161 (“[C]onsolidation has imposed a financial burden on plaintiffs in the aviation disaster cases by increasing the time and cost of preparation.”); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D.
Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8
(1996) (noting that rising civil litigation costs are “driv[ing] [parties] to skip all these expensive procedures and settle”). Although precise data concerning the portion of mass
tort MDL plaintiffs retaining counsel pursuant to a contingency fee arrangement relative
to those compensating counsel at an hourly rate, or pursuant to another scheme, are unavailable, it is certain that a substantial portion—likely a minority—are not operating under a contingency fee arrangement. As a result, they bear all the costs of MDL’s pricey,
protracted procedures. See CONLIN & CUSIMANO, supra (noting that some mass tort plaintiffs compensate counsel at an hourly rate); Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiation, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 341, 343 (1987) (“The alternate method of fee calculation . . . is the so-called lodestar system in which the lawyer is compensated with an hourly
rate, perhaps adjusted by some multiplier to reflect the quality of the work or the element
of risk involved.”); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 304 (1996) (implying that a portion of mass tort
plaintiffs eschew contingency fee arrangements by asserting that “[s]ome claimants may
have entered into contingency-fee contracts with individual lawyers.” (emphasis added)).
See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 720 (2005)
(stating that mass tort plaintiffs may owe “thousands of dollars in medical bills” allegedly
stemming from the defendants’ negligence).
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev’d in part, aff’d in
part, 789 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“The bench, bar and public at large are only too well
aware of the staggering costs that the asbestos personal injury litigation has generated.”).
Barton, supra note 38, at 203 (citing 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2, 34–35).
See id. at 202–03 (“[T]ransaction costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to
one . . . .” (citing 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC
COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 3)).
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not uncommon, for instance, for “[e]xpenses for a single deposi182
tion . . . [to] exceed $10,000.00,” a price often “passed on to the cli183
ent.”
In the breast implants MDL, for example, for every dollar plaintiffs recovered, pre-trial expenses consumed another sixty to seventy184
five cents. Unsurprisingly, as a result of costs engendered by MDL,
at least one implant maker filed for bankruptcy not long after the ini185
tiation of the implants MDL.
Further, in the asbestos MDL, successful plaintiffs recover “con186
siderably less than a third” of the “tens of billions that will be ex187
pended” by the litigants on MDL’s transaction costs. The transaction costs associated with litigating asbestos suits in the MDL court
leave the successful asbestos plaintiffs “only thirty-nine cents of every
188
asbestos dollar paid.”
Accordingly, for many mass tort MDL plaintiffs, the prospect of
proceeding to post-MDL trial with its “attendant expense and unpre189
dictability” after already costly MDL proceedings is prohibitively
uneconomical, if not financially impossible.
B. The MDL Judiciary Abides by a “Settlement or Nothing” Approach
The federal MDL judiciary’s pervasive “settlement or nothing” approach also contributes to MDL plaintiffs’ practical inability to exer190
cise their right to trial by jury.
The past several decades have seen the culture of federal judging
shift toward “an ideal of the managerial judge and away from a more
191
Pursuant to this new
neutral, judicial umpire and trial model.”
model, judges prioritize expediting and resolving parties’ disputes
over affording litigants access to an impartial forum to manage their
192
litigation. To do so, judges “experiment with schemes for speeding
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

191
192

CONLIN & CUSIMANO, supra note 176, § 8:31 n.1.
Id. § 8:31.
See Barton, supra note 38, at 203 (citing Higgins, supra note 40, at 53).
See id. (citing Higgins, supra note 40, at 53).
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 23 (1995).
Id.
Id.
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 159, at 270.
See id. (“[MDL] creates the perfect conditions for an aggregate settlement: . . . judicial
encouragement for a global settlement . . . .” (citing Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict
Variability and the Mass Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1013, 1056–66)).
See KANNER, supra note 60, at 23 (citing Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
374 (1982)) (explaining this shift in judicial ideology).
See id. (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 45).
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the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to settle rather
193
than try cases whenever possible.”
This shift toward settlement as the ideal is particularly pervasive in
the MDL courts; MDL judges—district court judges presiding over
MDL proceedings—more so than those not overseeing MDL proceedings, consistently prioritize and push for plaintiffs to settle before
the MDL court by verbally encouraging settlement and highlighting
194
post-MDL trial’s substantial costs. They direct discovery to focus on
information pertinent to settlement, prolong the already slow and
expensive MDL proceedings to induce settlement, refer the parties to
magistrate judges for settlement negotiations, appoint special managers and settlement counsel to support settlement, and aggressively
utilize settlement conferences and firm trial dates to realize expedi195
This “settlement or nothing” attitude is “intious settlement.
196
grained” in many MDL judges, who view their role as “getting the
197
parties to a claims process—a settlement—as quickly as possible.”
Accordingly, scholars and judges have begun to recognize that MDL
judges treat “the MDL process . . . only as a mechanism for reaching a
198
settlement,” and those litigants who acted lawfully and desire adjudication before a jury, but are nonetheless before an MDL court, can
199
“no longer hope to prevail.” While the MDL judiciary’s “settlement
or nothing” approach bolsters efficiency and economy, it is repug-

193
194

195
196
197
198
199

Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982).
See ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13.11 (David Herr ed., 2009)
(“[T]he judge can focus the parties’ attention on the likely cost of litigating the case to
conclusion, in fees, expenses, time, and other resources. Other helpful measures include
scheduling settlement conferences, directing or encouraging reluctant parties, insurers,
and other potential contributors to participate, suggesting and arranging for a neutral
person to assist negotiations, targeting discovery at information needed for settlement,
and promptly deciding motions whose resolution will lay the groundwork for settlement.”); Richard J. Arsenault & J.R. Whaley, Multidistrict Litigation and Bellwether Trials:
Leading Litigants to Resolution in Complex Litigation, 39 BRIEF 60, 61 (2009) (detailing MDL
judges’ “various techniques to promote settlement” (citing ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, § 13.1-.15)); Herrmann, supra note 166, at 45 (“Many [MDL]
judges view their role as ‘getting the parties to a claims process’—a settlement—as quickly
as possible . . . . [T]he MDL process serves only as a mechanism for reaching a settlement.”); Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist
Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2277–79
(2008) (discussing the MDL judiciary’s role in “settlement promotion” (citing In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1404 (11th Cir. 1991))).
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
Herrmann, supra note 166, at 45.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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nant in that it is partially responsible for many mass tort plaintiffs’ inability to exercise their constitutional right to trial by jury.
Many who have recognized the judiciary’s overwhelming support
of MDL’s function “as a means of achieving final, global [settlement]
200
201
of mass . . . disputes” have decried this “unfortunat[e]” reality as
202
productive of coercive “blackmail settlements.” Chief Judge Frank
Easterbrook, for example, denounced what he perceives as the
203
“model of the central planner” underlying attitudes toward the settlement of aggregate litigation. The MDL courts’ aggressive use of
the judicial settlement conference to realize settlement, for instance,
has been criticized as using “[t]he most controversial of all judicial
management tools . . . stray[ing] furthest from the judiciary’s tradi204
tional adjudicative role” by those opposed to MDL’s current role as
205
a “settlement promotion” device. That nearly all MDL cases con206
clude in pretrial settlement thus comes as no surprise.
Accordingly, despite its furtherance of economy and efficiency,
the federal judiciary’s pressuring and prioritizing settlement is worrisome and should be critically addressed; this pervasive “settlement or
nothing” approach works in tandem with the substantial costs associated with MDL proceedings and bellwether trials’ inducement of settlement to practically preclude MDL plaintiffs from exercising their
right to be heard by a jury.
C. Bellwether Trials Induce and Accelerate MDL Settlement
Bellwether trials, a practice pervasive in MDL and unique to aggregate litigation, facilitate, accelerate, and “supply a strong impetus
207
for” pretrial MDL settlement. Bellwethers afford parties to an MDL
real world, settlement-inducing jury data concerning claim valuation,
strategies and novel issues in the litigation, parties’ strengths and
weaknesses, probabilities of success, and the answers to important
questions otherwise only answerable through the lessons of years of
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig. 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Herrmann, supra note 166, at 45.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tire Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir.
2002).
Marcus, supra note 194, at 2277 (quoting Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New
Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 43 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2278–79 (citing Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 358 (1986)).
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2366.
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mass tort litigation.208 Bellwethers thus create a particularly “favorable
209
environment for global resolution through settlement,” enable corporate defendants and MDL judges to employ particularly influential
data and information to pressure plaintiffs and their PMCs to settle
their tort claims, and, consequently, work in tandem with MDL proceedings’ exorbitant costs and the MDL judiciary’s “settlement or
nothing” approach to effectively prohibit MDL plaintiffs from securing a trial by jury.
Given that a test run can never faultlessly duplicate a trial, a court
management technique common to MDL is to try a small number of
selected cases, affording the parties “an accurate picture of how different juries would view different cases across the spectrum of weak
210
and strong cases that are aggregated.” Such a case typically involves
“facts, claims, or defenses that are similar to [those] presented in a
211
wider group of related cases.” These “test cases” are known as bellwether trials. While the parties to an MDL can consent to be bound
212
Alby the bellwether jury trial’s verdict, doing so is uncommon.
most always, bellwether cases’ judgments are only legally binding on
213
The MDL court can select the
those particular litigants involved.
cases that will serve as bellwether cases, or the MDL court may permit
the parties to select a certain number of cases to serve as bellweth214
ers. Given the prevalence of bellwethers, “[s]ecuring parties’ consent for these trials is now an important aspect of the MDL courts’
215
management of cases.”

208

209

210
211
212

213
214
215

See id. at 2325 (“[B]y injecting juries and fact-finding into multidistrict litigation, bellwether trials assist in the maturation of disputes by providing an opportunity for coordinating counsel to organize the products of pretrial common discovery, evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of their arguments and evidence, and understand the risks and
costs associated with the litigation.”).
Arsenault & Whaley, supra note 194, at 61. See Bradt, supra note 11, at 790 (“[B]ellwether
trials . . . provide important data about the value of the claims, perhaps leading to settlement discussions.” (citing Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1485 (2005))); Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2325 (“[T]he bellwether
process can precipitate global settlement negotiations and ensure that such negotiations
do not occur in a vacuum, but rather in light of real-world evaluations of the litigation by
multiple juries.”).
Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691, 697 (2006).
Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2325.
See Sherman, supra note 210, at 696–97 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l
Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989) (explaining the effects of bellwether judgments), rev’d on other grounds, 964 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1992)).
See id. at 697.
See id.
Bradt, supra note 11, at 789 (citing Lee et al., supra note 11, at 5).

Oct. 2013]

ANIMATING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT

265

The appeal, and vice, of bellwether trials stems from their in216
ducement and acceleration of pretrial MDL settlement, a function
217
that bellwether trials are aimed at realizing. Because bellwether trials comprise a representative sample of an MDL’s cases, they yield
important, reliable information concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the sides’ cases and potential trial strategies, claim valuation, and probabilities of success before a jury, and enable the working through of novel issues in individual litigation “before either an
218
aggregate trial or, much more likely, a global settlement.”
Bellwethers thus permit mass torts to “mature” without years of
expensive litigation otherwise required for such maturity, providing
the parties with informed answers to the questions that one must
consider when evaluating settlement: “What does the liability picture
look like? Are there comparative negligence issues? Is preemption
or the exclusion of experts going to be in play? What are the ranges
of damages? Will punitive damages be a factor? How long will it take
to try cases, and at what cost? How many and what types of experts
will be required? Will the cost to litigate any single case exceed po219
tential recoveries?”
Consequently, these “real-world evaluations of the litigation by
220
multiple juries” not only “anchor litigants’ otherwise speculative
221
and overly hopeful settlement claim valuations” and “se[t] the stage
222
for . . . global resolution,” but they, more importantly, enable corporate defendants and MDL judges to employ particularly accurate,
influential data and information to pressure plaintiffs and their PMCs
223
Accordingly, since bellwethers’
to settle their mass tort claims.
emergence, scholars, litigants, attorneys, and judges commonly at216

217
218

219

220
221
222
223

See Stier, supra note 190, at 1059–61 (citing Barbara J. Rothstein et al., A Model Mass Tort:
The PPA Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 625 (2006)) (detailing bellwethers’ inducement
of settlement).
See Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2343 (explaining that bellwethers trials’ goals are to
serve as “indicators of future trends and catalysts for an ultimate resolution”).
Sherman, supra note 210, at 698; see also Bradt, supra note 11, at 790 (“Even though the
results of these bellwether trials are not binding on parties who are not participants in the
trials, they provide important data about the value of the claims, perhaps leading to settlement discussions.” (citing Cabraser, supra note 209, at 1485)).
See Arsenault & Whaley, supra note 194, at 61 (citing ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 194, at § 22.314) (detailing the important pre-settlement legal
questions for which bellwethers furnish reliable, informative answers).
Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2366.
Stier, supra note 190, at 1059 (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298
(7th Cir. 1995)).
Arsenault & Whaley, supra note 194, at 61.
See id. at 61 (explaining how bellwethers are “used in mass torts to value cases and encourage settlement”).
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tribute the realization of cases’ global resolution to bellwethers’ set224
tlement-inducing efforts.
Bellwethers also facilitate the settlement of those comparable
claims not yet before an MDL court, as mass tort lawyers “keep careful track of verdicts and settlements in other cases, and this information provides the basis for considerable agreement as to the set225
tlement value of individual cases.” By “bringing fact-finding to the
226
forefront of multidistrict litigation,” bellwethers facilitate the realization of settlement—both today and, in the case of comparable future cases, tomorrow.
Thus, despite the federal judiciary’s admiration of bellwethers for
227
the mechanism’s support of judicial economy and efficiency, there
exists at least one reason to be critical of the practice. Namely, bellwethers—by affording litigants real jury data concerning claim valuation, parties’ strengths and weaknesses, probabilities of success, trial
strategies, novel issues in the litigation, and answers to important
questions otherwise only answerable through the lessons of years of
litigation—accelerate and support defendants’ and MDL courts’ inducement of pretrial settlement. These bellwethers work in tandem
with MDL’s exorbitant costs and the MDL judiciary’s “settlement or
nothing” approach to practically preclude mass tort MDL plaintiffs
from securing a post-MDL trial by jury.
V. THE COURT’S PERMISSIVE SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
ENABLES THESE PRACTICES TO RELEGATE PLAINTIFFS’ TRIAL-BY-JURY
RIGHT
That a substantial majority of consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs are practically unable to exercise their constitutional right to trial
by jury raises a number of serious questions and concerns. Principal,
however, is the question of how the Court permitted the Seventh
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee to play second fiddle to the judiciary’s preference for FAA-supported arbitration and MDL’s efficiency
and economy benefits.
This Part explores this question, analyzing the Court’s Seventh
Amendment trial-by-jury jurisprudence, a cluster of five cases in
224

225
226
227

See Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 2369, 2378 (2008) (“[I]n the absence of the bellwether procedure these cases would
not have settled . . . .”).
Sherman, supra note 210, at 701 n.37.
Fallon et al., supra note 59, at 2341–42.
See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997) (regarding bellwethers as a “sound” practice).
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which the Court considered five civil procedural innovations against
228
This Comment
the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee.
pays particular attention to the Court’s mode of analysis concerning
the meaning and substance of the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial
guarantee and how the contested procedures impact the guarantee.
This Part also provides an answer to this question: the Court has
demonstrated a striking willingness to accept modern civil procedural
innovations’ impacts on the civil jury trial through formal rather than
pragmatic Seventh Amendment analyses, focusing primarily on the
threshold issue of power-shifting between the judge and jury and declining to craft a meaningful trial-by-jury jurisprudence that would
provide us with an operative understanding of the right. Consequently, we lack a Seventh Amendment vocabulary with which to analyze procedures implicating or, in the case of FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL, conflicting with plaintiffs’ exercise of
their constitutional trial-by-jury rights, permitting the continued vitality of such procedures and their attendant infringements upon plaintiffs’ right.
A. Dimick v. Schiedt and Additur
In 1934’s Dimick v. Schiedt, the sole case in which the Court struck
a procedure as inconsistent with the trial-by-jury guarantee, the Court
considered whether the guarantee was consistent with additur, a
229
judge’s unilateral increase of a jury’s damages award. After the jury
awarded the plaintiff five hundred dollars, the plaintiff moved for a
new trial on the ground that the jury rendered an inadequate ver230
dict. The judge granted plaintiff’s motion but stated that he would
not enforce it if the defendant consented to an increase of the jury’s
231
damages award. After the defendant consented to the increase and
228

229
230
231

The Court decided several other cases interpreting the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause and rendered one other decision dealing exclusively with the court’s interpretation of complex patent claims. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415 (1996) (holding that New York’s law controlling compensation awards for excessiveness or inadequacy can be given effect, consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause, if the review standard set out in the New York statute is applied by the
federal courts with appellate control of the trial court’s ruling limited to review for “abuse
of discretion”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding
that patent claim construction is a matter of law to be determined by the court). However, because these cases shed no further light on, and are largely impertinent to, the
meaning and substance of plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury right, they are not included in this analysis.
See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 475–76.
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the Court resultantly denied plaintiff’s motion, the plaintiff ap232
The appellate court reversed, deeming the trial-by-jury
pealed.
233
guarantee inconsistent with additur.
In evaluating and ultimately affirming the unconstitutionality of
additur, the Court launched a brief analysis of, first, whether additur
or an analogous procedure existed at common law. It found that an
“authoritative decision sustaining the power of an English court to
234
[employ additur]” or an analogous procedure did not exist. In fact,
the common law rules “forbade the court to increase the amount of
235
Consequently, the court explained
damages awarded by a jury.”
that, because the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury right “has in ef236
fect adopted the rules of the common law,” additur must be stricken, as “[t]o effectuate any change in these rules is not to deal with the
237
common law, qua common law, but to alter the Constitution.”
Despite its conclusion condemning additur, the Court declined to
discuss its meaning or substance, any trial-by-jury policy concerns, or
even how, exactly, additur infringed upon the right such that the
procedure was unconstitutional. The Court’s only statement concerning additur’s practical inconsistency with the trial-by-jury guarantee was that, when additur is employed, “no jury . . . ever passe[s] on
238
the increased amount.” From this, we can infer that the Court reasoned that an increase to a jury’s damages award, an issue of “fact,” is
impermissible because the jury never considered awarding an
amount more than it actually awarded in damages. A court-ordered
increase in the damages award would therefore constitute a court
impermissibly serving as finder of fact by independently determining
damages.
Not only is this reasoning unconvincing, as the Court fails to substantiate why it is valid to assume that a jury never considered a damages award larger than it actually awarded, but it sheds no light on
the meaning or substance of the trial-by-jury guarantee that additur
supposedly infringes upon.
The Court then focused on “the controlling distinction between
239
the power of the court and that of the jury,” though it spoke exclusively to the former. In a relatively lengthy discussion, the Court de232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239

See id. at 476.
See id.
Id. at 476–77.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
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tailed the contours of a judge’s authority concerning a jury’s damages
award, which is quite expansive: judges are empowered to, for example, decrease, but not increase, a jury’s damages award, as such a
240
practice was permitted at common law.
However, the Court, again, failed to delineate or even allude to
the substance or meaning of the trial-by-jury right, nor did the Court
address the jury’s substantive powers or their preservation, stating on241
ly that “the jury . . . [has] the power . . . to determine the facts,”
such as damages. Nonetheless, despite the Court’s formidable authority and its failure to lay out how additur infringed upon the trialby-jury right, the Court reiterated that, because courts were prohibited from increasing damages awards at common law, additur was an
242
unconstitutional practice, and struck it accordingly.
B. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. and a Partial New
Trial on Separable Legal Issues
In 1931’s Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., the Court
considered whether the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee
was consistent with a court’s ordering of a partial new trial to deter243
mine damages following a jury’s verdict on damages and liability.
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover contractu244
al royalties. After the jury rendered its verdict, the appellate court
reversed and ordered a new trial, but restricted it to the determination of damages, not liability, as the first jury had properly decided
245
the latter. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the withdrawal from
consideration by the new jury of his liability was a denial of his right
246
to trial by jury.
The Court began its brief evaluation of a partial new trial on separable legal issues by employing its historical approach, finding that,
although the practice did not exist at common law, several eight247
eenth-century state legislatures codified the practice. Given this inconsistency, the Court proceeded to examine whether this practice
left intact the substance of the Seventh Amendment, as “the Constitu-

240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id.
Id.
Id. at 487–88.
283 U.S. 494 (1931).
Id. at 495.
Id. at 496–97.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 497–98.
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tion is concerned, not with form, but with substance.”248 As expected,
however, the Court said almost nothing about the substance of or
policies underlying the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee,
except that “[a]ll of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of
249
fact be submitted” to the jury, and the issue of damages is one of
250
fact.
Unsurprisingly, without detailing the partial new trial’s impact on
the right to trial by jury, the Court proceeded to uphold the partial
new trial as consistent with the trial-by-jury right. “[W]here the requirement of a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to
251
law upon one issue of fact” and a separable issue must be retried,
the Seventh Amendment does not require the entire case to be retried, but permits the Court to submit to a new jury just the separable
issue. The Court reasoned that, in such cases, all of the “issues of
252
fact” are inevitably submitted to a jury.
The Court’s analysis is unsatisfying. Not only did the Court again
decline to define or even discuss the substance of or policies behind
the right to trial by jury, but it failed to consider how a partial new
trial on a separable legal issue may practically impact or interact with
the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee and the jury’s ability to
serve as finder of fact. For example, the Court did not offer any
guidelines concerning when courts may, consistent with the trial-byjury guarantee, usurp a jury’s verdict by ordering a new trial on a particular issue, and instead simply noted that the practice may be em253
ployed where the issue to be retried is “distinct and separable.”
Relatedly, and perhaps of greater consequence, the Court did not
consider the potential for liberal employment of this practice to lead
to judicial abuse or overreaching—namely, a court’s using this practice to effectively dispose of jury verdicts concerning separable issues
with which it disagreed. Given that this practice affords courts measurable latitude concerning the practical impact of jury verdicts, one
would reasonably expect the Court to grapple with such issues instead
of focusing exclusively on whether the practice formally respected the
254
Seventh Amendment’s command that “issues of fact be submitted”
to the jury. However, clearly, one would be disappointed.

248
249
250
251
252
253
254

Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 500 (citing Norfolk S. R.R. v. Ferebee, 238 U.S. 269, 274 (1915)).
Id. at 498 (citing Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
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C. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States and Summary Judgment
In 1902’s Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, the Court considered the constitutionality of the predecessor to summary judgment.255
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover a sum
256
owed to the plaintiff pursuant to a contract. Plaintiff filed a motion
“for judgment, under the seventy-third rule, for failure of the defend257
ant to file with his plea a sufficient affidavit of defence.” This motion permitted the court to enter judgment for the plaintiff if two
conditions were met: the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating the cause
of action and recovery owed, and the defendant failed to, with his
plea, file an affidavit in response detailing why plaintiff should not be
258
permitted to recover. The defendant argued that this practice de259
prived him of his right to trial by jury.
In upholding the summary-judgment-like practice, the Court embarked on yet another brief, formalistic Seventh Amendment analysis.
Expectedly, the Court quickly established that the practice was consistent with the courts’ historical practice, presaging the Court’s deci260
sion to deem it constitutional.
However, in an initially promising move, the Court proceeded to
analyze the relationship between the trial-by-jury guarantee and the
261
Disappointingly, though, this
summary-judgment-like practice.
analysis consisted entirely of the following three perplexing, uninformative assertions:
[The summary-judgment-like procedure] prescribes the means of making an issue. The issue made as prescribed, the right of trial by jury accrues. The purpose of the . . . [procedure] is to preserve the court from

255

256
257
258

259
260

261

See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (“[S]ummary judgment does
not violate the Seventh Amendment.” (citing Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.
S. 315, 319–21 (1902))). But see Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra
note 8, at 164 (“The Supreme Court and scholars were wrong to have cited Fidelity as the
case that established the constitutionality of summary judgment, because the procedure
in Fidelity did not resemble summary judgment.”).
See Fid. & Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 316.
Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 165 (citing Fid. &
Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 318–19) (explaining this motion). Like its progeny, the summary
judgment motion, this motion asks for the court to issue a verdict, rather than proceed to
trial by jury, where the court determines that no dispute of material fact exists in the case.
See Fid. & Deposit Co., 187 U.S. at 318.
See id. at 319 (“The rule was formerly number 75 and has existed a long time. The Court
of Appeals of the District has sustained its validity in a number of cases. This court also
sustained its validity in Smoot v. Rittenhouse, decided January 10, 1876.”).
See id. at 319–20.
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frivolous defences [sic] and to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as
262
means to delay the recovery of just demands.

The Court’s analysis indicates that it was seemingly moved to uphold the summary-judgment-like practice because it determined that
the practice protected the courts from frivolous defenses and merely
framed, rather than permitted the court to decide upon, the issues,
thus remaining formally consistent with the Seventh Amendment’s
263
mandate that issues of fact be submitted to the jury.
This reasoning defies logic. Permitting courts to enter judgments
where they deem a party’s defense “frivolous” is not a framing of the
issues, but an effective judicial determination of them based on a
court’s assessment of the facts in dispute. It is also strikingly reminiscent of the superficial reasoning underlying MDL’s continued vitality—namely, that MDL furthers judicial and litigant economy and efficiency while remaining formally consistent with the trial-by-jury
guarantee, as cases are theoretically, but not actually, remanded to
their home districts at the close of centralized pretrial proceedings.
Disappointingly, as is indicated by the Court’s silence concerning
the import of the trial-by-jury right and the summary-judgment-like
practice’s impact on the right, the Court failed to offer us any understanding, operative or otherwise, of the trial-by-jury right or its underlying policy concerns. That the Court was not even perturbed by the
summary-judgment-like practice is surprising, as the practice clearly
affords the courts discretion to enter judgment for one of the parties
exclusively based on its determination of the facts, constituting a
clear deprivation of plaintiffs’ right to secure a jury to serve as factfinder. Nonetheless, the Court seemingly had no qualms about unconditionally deeming the practice consistent with the trial-by-jury
guarantee, paving the way for summary judgment to become the procedural mainstay that it is today.
D. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman and Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict
The Court, in 1935’s Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,
considered the relationship between the trial-by-jury guarantee and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the practice of reserving legal
questions arising during trials and subjecting the jury verdict to the
court’s ultimate ruling on the legal questions reserved. The plaintiff
262
263

Id. at 320 (alteration in original). The Court supplemented its analysis by detailing the
rule’s historic employment by the courts. See id. at 319–20.
See id. at 320.
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sued the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries.264 At
trial, the defendant moved for dismissal of the action and a directed
265
verdict. The trial court reserved its decisions on both motions and
submitted the case to the jury, whose verdict would be subject to the
266
court’s rulings on the legal issues in the motions reserved. The jury
subsequently returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the court de267
nied both reserved motions. The appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial, questioning the constitutionality of the practice of
268
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Sustaining the constitutionality of the practice in yet another brief
decision, the Court quickly determined that “[a]t common law there
was a well-established practice of [employing judgment notwithstand269
Thus, the Court emphatically upheld the pracing the verdict].”
tice, holding that it “undoubtedly was well established when the Sev270
enth Amendment was adopted.”
This time, however, the Court supplemented its formalistic opinion upholding the practice of judgment notwithstanding the verdict
271
with a modicum of coherent reasoning. The Court explained that,
pursuant to the practice, courts only determine questions of law, such
272
as “whether the evidence was sufficient or otherwise,” not questions
of fact, so, as a result, the practice is respectful of plaintiffs’ “right to
273
This is the Court’s
have the issues of fact determined by a jury.”
sole pronouncement of the trial-by-jury right’s meaning.
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion is once again disappointing; it
declined to detail the substance or policy behind the trial-by-jury
right, simply noting, again, that juries are responsible for determin274
ing facts, a vague assertion that the Court often reiterates. Instead,
the Court chose to return to its focus on “the common-law distinction
275
between the province of the court and that of the jury,” though on264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

272
273
274
275

Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
The Court also dedicated a substantial portion of its opinion to distinguishing the legally
significant facts of the instant case from those of Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co. See
id. at 657–59, 661.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 658.
Id. The Court also made several impertinent assertions concerning the reexamination
clause. See id.
Id. at 657.
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ly detailing the former, explaining, in sum, that courts have ample
authority to determine all questions of law regardless of the form in
which they emerge or when the Court decides to render such determinations, including, as was the case in Baltimore & Carolina Line, af276
ter the jury rendered its findings of fact.
Relatedly, the Court afforded no attention to the pragmatic impact of the practice being upheld, focusing instead on the practice’s
formal consistency with the notion that it only enables the court to
277
rule on questions of law, leaving questions of fact to the jury. For
example, the Court failed to define or discuss if or when this practice’s employment would infringe upon a jury’s ability to determine
questions of fact. Given that the practice permits courts to effectively
overrule jury verdicts by deciding that, after the jury renders its verdict, the party for whom the jury ruled failed to supply sufficient evidence, such a concern seems warranted. Nonetheless, the Court was
evidently unconcerned by such prospects, convinced, instead, to enshrine the practice by virtue of its formal consistency with the Seventh
Amendment’s command that “issues of fact [be] determined by a ju278
ry.”
E. Galloway v. United States and Directed Verdict
Finally, the Court, in 1943’s Galloway v. United States, evaluated the
directed verdict, the procedure by which a court orders a verdict before the jury renders its own, employed where a court determines
that a party has produced insufficient evidence such that no reasona279
ble jury could find in his favor. The plaintiff sued the government,
and the trial court issued a directed verdict in the defendant’s fa280
The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguvor.
281
ment that the directed verdict violated his trial-by-jury right.
The Court took little time to unconditionally uphold the directed
verdict, finding that several analogous procedures, through which the
276
277

278
279
280
281

Id. at 657–60.
See id. at 658–59 (“The trial court expressly reserved its ruling on the defendant’s motions
to dismiss and for a directed verdict, both of which were based on the asserted insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff. Whether the evidence was
sufficient or otherwise was a question of law to be resolved by the court . . . . At common
law there was a well established practice of reserving questions of law arising during trials
by jury and of taking verdicts subject to the ultimate ruling on the questions reserved . . . .”).
Id. at 658.
This procedure is commonly known as judgment as a matter of law.
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 373 (1943).
Id.
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court “weighed the evidence, not only piecemeal but in toto for sub282
mission to the jury,” existed at common law. Consequently, pursuant to its historical approach, the Court deemed the practice constitutional, stating that the plaintiff’s “objection therefore comes too
283
late.”
Despite this, the Court, in an initially promising move, embarked
upon an evaluation of the relationship between the trial-by-jury guar284
antee and the directed verdict. However, yet again, the Court failed
to offer any insight concerning the substance, meaning, or policy behind the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee, instead supporting its conclusion that the right to trial by jury and the directed
verdict are consistent by detailing historical evidence for its assertion
that “[t]he jury was not absolute master of fact in 1791. Then, as
now, courts excluded evidence for irrelevancy and relevant proof for
285
The Court likewise, though expectedly, failed to
other reasons.”
define or even discuss what qualified as “fact,” nor did it delineate
why “evidence” was somehow a non-factual issue over which the
courts, and not the jury, possessed authority.
The rest of the Court’s analysis consisted primarily of discussion
concerning the costly, perverse results that would stem from prohibiting the courts from rendering a judgment where they determine that
a party has produced insufficient evidence such that no reasonable
jury could find in his favor, and, unsurprisingly, the power of the
courts—particularly their ability to enter judgments for a party where
the court is unsatisfied with “the legal sufficiency” of the evidence
286
The Court concluded that because,
supporting one side’s case.
now and at common law, a court could issue a directed verdict where
it determined that a party failed to produce sufficient evidence to
support his or her case such that a reasonable jury could not rule in
his or her favor, a court’s issuance of a directed verdict reflected its
determination of a legal, rather than factual, question and was con287
sequently consistent with the Seventh Amendment.
The Court’s reasoning is unsatisfyingly formalistic and shortsighted, as it ignores the practical realities and dangers engendered
by affording the courts free reign to issue decisions on “legal ques-

282
283
284
285
286
287

Id. at 390. The Court spent nearly the entirety of the opinion preceding this determination by detailing the factual issues in dispute.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 389–96.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 389–90, 392–93.
Id. at 389–93, 396.
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tions” that, in effect, preclude juries from deciding facts. For instance, a court may assert that because the evidence is allegedly “insufficient,” no reasonable jury would rule for a particular party and,
accordingly, issue a directed verdict preventing the jury from exercising its authority to rule on any of the case’s factual issues. A court
may even be tempted to issue a directed verdict if it believes further
litigation to be wasteful or unnecessary. The Court did not even address this deleterious practical reality, or any others, but was seemingly secure in its decision that the practice’s constitutionality was
evinced by its analogous common law antecedents and formal consistency with the Court’s holding that the jury is the trier of fact. Accordingly, the Court noted that, concerning such abuse stemming
288
from its refusal to craft “standards of proof” defining when courts
may employ directed verdicts and effectively prevent juries from serving as fact-finders, “the obvious remedy is by correction on appellate
289
review.”
This conclusion is an unconvincing one, especially given the delay, costs, and uncertainty of appellate review weighed against the
constitutional nature of the right being infringed. Conversely, what is
truly “obvious” is that, as illustrated by its consistent refusal to define
or detail the trial-by-jury right, the Court is unconcerned with plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right, paving the way for procedural innovations that are formally but not practically consistent with preserving
plaintiffs’ ability to secure a jury to serve as finder of fact—such as
MDL and FAA-supported individual arbitration agreements—to
compel plaintiffs to relinquish their constitutional right to trial by jury. This contravenes the “fundamental principle of American law
290
that every person is entitled to his or her day in court.”
VI. THE COURT SHOULD RESUME AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FIELD OF
SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. A Critical Glance at the Court’s Conception of the Constitutional Right to
Trial by Jury
Consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs’ practical inability to exercise their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury should have
sparked a discussion among the members of the federal judiciary on,
at a minimum, two consequential issues: whether (1) corporations’
288
289
290

Id. at 395.
Id.
Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998).
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use of deceptively worded and inconspicuous adhesive arbitration
agreements binding unknowing, unsophisticated consumers to individual arbitration and (2) the courts’ employment of a pretrial centralization process that effectively compels nearly all mass tort plaintiffs to settle their claims are consistent with consumers’ and mass tort
291
plaintiffs’ “fundamental” constitutional right to trial by jury. However, the reality is that it has not. Neither courts, nor legislators, nor
policymakers have acknowledged the tension between binding, FAAsupported individual arbitration agreements, MDL, and consumer
and mass tort plaintiffs’ compulsively relinquished right to trial by jury, and, instead, remain content with these practices’ formal—rather
292
than practical—consistency with the Seventh Amendment.
A principal reason why courts, legislators, and policymakers have
failed to address this tension is clear: the Court’s scant Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence is extraordinarily permissive of civil procedural innovations’ impacts on the jury trial right, consistently upholding procedures provided that they are formally consistent with
the Court’s undefined conception of the jury’s role as decider of “is293
sues of fact.” In none of its trial-by-jury cases has the Court defined
or detailed the substance of the trial-by-jury right, the meaning of
“fact,” or any trial-by-jury policy concerns. Instead, it has focused almost exclusively on practices’ formal consistency with the Seventh
Amendment—the idea that they leave intact some chance that a jury
be permitted to determine issues of fact—and the expansive powers
of the trial judge. Operating under such a guise, the Court has upheld nearly all procedural innovations against trial-by-jury challenges,
signaling to legislators, policymakers, jurists, and the public that the
constitutional right to trial by jury is not a consequential, substantive
one, but an illusory, formal one that need not concern, in the case of
FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL, corporate defendants or MDL courts.
Consequently, we also have no operative Seventh Amendment vocabulary with which to evaluate procedural innovations that impact
291
292

293

Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (citing Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S.
408, 412 (1882)).
See Sternlight, supra note 28, at 670 (“[C]ourts, legislators, policymakers, and the public
have paid very little attention to the direct tension between mandatory binding arbitration and the right to a jury trial.”). Jurists’ and legislators’ failure to acknowledge the tension between MDL and the trial-by-jury right is evinced by the absence of scholarly, congressional, and jurisprudential attention to the issue.
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) (identifying the
“vital significance” in trial by jury of ensuring that issues of fact are submitted to the jury
with instructions and guidance (citing Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931))).
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plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury rights. Despite rendering numerous decisions
concerning the constitutional right to trial by jury, the only pertinent
jurisprudential proclamation in our arsenal is that juries are to determine “issues of fact;” yet the Court has failed to define or detail its
sole statement of consequence. Thus, the Court has given us no
method of critically evaluating whether the practical impact of any
given procedural innovation leaves intact plaintiffs’ constitutional
right to trial by jury, and has instead signaled that procedures are
permissible where they formally permit plaintiffs some chance that a
jury will be able to determine “issues of fact.”
The question of why the Court decided to go down the path of diluting and ignoring plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury is a more difficult one with which to grapple. However, this
analysis of the Court’s right-to-trial-by-jury jurisprudence suggests a
likely reason for the Court’s longtime retreat to its formalistic, largely
undefined conception of the jury trial guarantee: if the Court resumed an active role in the field and afforded us an operative understanding of plaintiffs’ constitutional right to trial by jury, it would be
forced to strike many, if not most, of the civil procedural innovations
pervasive among federal courts today.
Many of these procedural innovations, even aside from FAAsupported adhesive arbitration agreements and MDL, share a tenuous connection with plaintiffs’ right to trial by jury as is, one that
would certainly deteriorate if the Court was forced to define and afford substance to plaintiffs’ jury trial right. Although not the subject
of this Comment, these procedures undoubtedly include the motion
to dismiss, summary judgment, and remittitur; as for their practical
impacts on plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury rights, these procedures have gar294
nered substantial scholarly criticism.
Alternatively, the Court could attempt to craft distinctions concerning the extent to which a practice may, consistent with the constitutional right to trial by jury, impede plaintiffs’ access to a jury that
would preserve many of its procedural innovations. However, such
an endeavor would be untenable and incredibly challenging to effec294

See Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 1890 (“The
motion to dismiss is fast becoming the new summary judgment motion and with this
movement, the civil jury trial continues to disappear.” (citing Thomas, Why Summary
Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 141)); Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, supra note 8, at 734 (“[R]emittitur in fact does
impinge the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial and is thus unconstitutional.”); Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, supra note 8, at 139–40 (“[N]o procedure similar to
summary judgment existed under the English common law and . . . summary judgment
violates the core principles or ‘substance’ of the English common law.”).
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tuate, as several of these procedures, such as FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL, preclude most affected plaintiffs from ever exercising their trial-by-jury right. In any case, the prospects of
striking centuries of judicial approval and practice or crafting a new
body of trial-by-jury jurisprudence are dim, and are the likely culprits
behind the Court’s permissive, formalistic trial-by-jury jurisprudence.
However, upon directly confronting the tension between FAAsupported arbitration agreements, MDL, and consumer and MDL
mass tort plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, one
sees that the tension must be taken seriously: the Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury guarantee should play an operative role in consumer and mass tort MDL litigation, particularly in the majority of
cases in which unclear, inconspicuous FAA-supported adhesive arbitration agreements lock unknowing, uneducated, and unsophisticated consumer plaintiffs into binding individual arbitration, preventing
them from exercising their trial-by-jury right, and in those cases in
which MDL’s costs, the MDL judiciary’s “settlement or nothing” approach, and the impact of bellwethers preclude mass tort plaintiffs
from securing a trial by jury.
The monumental importance of the Seventh Amendment to the
295
Framers demands this result. The Framers, who remembered that
296
the jury was the hard-fought “choice of the founders,” recognized
297
the prospect that the “fundamental” jury trial right may, in some
cases, be inefficient or cumbersome but nevertheless “felt that jury
298
rights were of central importance,” and included them in the Bill of
Rights accordingly. To permit the Court to circumvent this critical
constitutional right through its extraordinarily formalistic, permissive
trial-by-jury jurisprudence is to effectively relegate the Framers’ constitutional mandate, an ironic move for a Court that is seemingly so
deeply concerned with preserving the Seventh Amendment status
quo as of 1791.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, ignoring this tension
and effectively marginalizing consumer and MDL mass tort plaintiffs’
trial-by-jury rights engenders a number of practical dangers. Princi295
296

297
298

See supra Part II.A.
Suja A. Thomas, Professor of Law, Before and After the Summary Judgment Trilogy, Keynote Speech at the Seattle University School of Law Colloquium on the 25th Anniversary
of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Reflections on Summary Judgment, Univ. of Ill. Coll.
of Law (April 11, 2012), in 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 499, 512.
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (citing Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S.
408, 412 (1882)).
Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992).
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pally, it threatens many of the litigant and societal interests that the
Seventh Amendment is thought to protect, a more tangible reason
mandating that the Court take an active role in the field of Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence by affording the trial-by-jury right a substantive meaning and properly addressing the tension between FAAsupported arbitration agreements, MDL, and consumer and MDL
mass tort plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right.
B. The Practical Dangers of Marginalizing Prospective Consumer and Mass
Tort Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment Right
That prospective consumer and mass tort MDL plaintiffs lack the
leverage that a genuine threat of trial provides is chief among the
practical dangers sparked by the Court’s failure to address the tension between FAA-supported arbitration agreements, MDL, and af299
fected plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right. In the absence of such
leverage, these plaintiffs lack the threat necessary to bring about fair300
er, more even-handed settlements from corporate defendants, as
MDL settlements are negotiated with the mutual understanding that,
per the court’s encouragement, global settlement, not a protracted
public trial, will result, and private arbitral settlement discussions
pursued by those few consumer plaintiffs who pursue individual binding arbitration are guided by all parties’ certainty that a public trial
301
cannot occur. Consequently, corporate defendants have less incen299

300

301

See Lahav, supra note 156, at 593 (“The significance of the reliance on settlement to resolve mass tort litigation is twofold. First, individual litigants will not have the leverage
that a realistic threat of trial provides.” (citing Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence
Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 607
(1997))).
See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring A Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011) (“Without the realistic possibility of a trial, settlements in large measure reflect and discount the costs of discovery
and trial. As a result, some plaintiffs receive less than the value of their cases if tried on
the merits . . . .” (citing ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL, 40–68,
112–35 (2009)); Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances
Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 989 n.112 (1988) (“The backdrop of trial—and the likely
outcome there—is a significant influence on the negotiation-settlement process.” (citing
Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 32–
34 (1983))); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
192–93 (1987) (explaining the economics behind the settlement-encouraging effect that
the backdrop of potential litigation has on settlement negotiations); Steven Shavell, The
Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 575, 607 (1997) (“[T]he most important justification for . . . trials is . . . to
provide victims with the threat necessary to induce settlements.”).
See supra Part IV; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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tive to offer consumer and mass tort plaintiffs the sizable settlements
that they would have considered if negotiations occurred against the
302
backdrop of a public, costly, and protracted trial. This is not only
303
antidemocratic, but it has a propensity to produce fewer, smaller
settlements that may inadequately compensate consumer plaintiffs
304
and mass tort victims.
Moreover, arbitrations’ and MDL’s reliance on settlement and
private arbitral proceedings, respectively, are also consequential.
When binding arbitration and MDL are employed, the twin principles behind the right to trial by jury, democracy and impartiality, are
305
violated.
These practices violate the principles of democracy underpinning
the trial-by-jury right because, when arbitration or MDL is employed,
arbitrators or lawyers—not jurors, whose verdicts are thought to constitute the exercise of democracy within our judicial system—reach
settlement or determine liability privately, with limited judicial oversight, and records of their discussions or proceedings are inaccessible
306
Consequently, these practices are practically inconto the public.
307
Although
sistent with the jury trial right’s democracy principle.
seemingly intangible, the antidemocratic nature of these practices is
consequential because, “[s]ince the founding of our country, trials in
open court resulting in decisions by either a judge or jury have been
308
thought to be constitutive of American democracy.” The democra302
303
304
305

306

307
308

See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
See Lahav, supra note 156, at 593 (“The significance of the reliance on settlement to resolve mass tort litigation is twofold . . . . [T]he current regime violates both of the principles that animate the right to a jury trial.”).
See 2 WILLIAM M. HANNAY, LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, § 70:15 (2013) (“[A]rbitration
is a private process. Unlike court proceedings, arbitration proceedings do not become
part of the public record and are generally not public events.”); Burbank & Subrin, supra
note 300, at 401 (“Since the founding of our country, trials in open court resulting in decisions by either a judge or a jury have been thought to be constitutive of American democracy . . . . This right to be heard, the core of due process of law, has been integral to
democratic thought and institutions at least since the English Magna Carta in the thirteenth century.” (citing BURNS, supra note 300, at 40–68, 112–35); Lahav, supra note 156,
at 593 (“[J]uries do not determine damages in settled cases and individual plaintiffs are
not ordinarily involved in negotiations. Instead, lawyers (in some cases with judicial oversight) determine damages awards privately. Settlement is undemocratic because lawyers
reach settlement privately with limited judicial or client oversight.”); Jack B. Weinstein,
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 511 (1994)) (“[I]t is almost
impossible to settle many mass tort cases without a secrecy agreement.”).
See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
Burbank & Subrin, supra note 300, at 401 (citing BURNS, supra note 306, at 40–68, 112–
35).
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cy principle ensures that “each of us has had the opportunity to see
that the laws our representatives have chosen to replace the state of
309
nature are more than empty promises (or threats),” so their curtailment by FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL is not a
phenomenon to be ignored.
Furthermore, these practices contravene the trial-by-jury right’s
impartiality underpinning by supporting bias and facilitating corruption, as MDL’s decision makers—lawyers and judges—as well as arbitration’s decision makers—individual arbitrators—often have system310
For
ic interests at odds with those of the individual plaintiffs.
instance, MDL judges have “the interest of reducing their dockets
311
and may become inured to the plight of plaintiffs.” MDL lawyers,
too, often have their own interests that conflict with those of plaintiffs; for instance, these lawyers have been known to “be tempted to
trade some clients off against others to resolve large numbers of cases
312
Likewise, because corporations will attempt to select
collectively.”
an arbitrator who is “at least unconsciously biased toward the compa313
ny,” arbitral decision makers are often biased toward corporate interests and, consequently, decrease plaintiffs’ potential payout, where
314
To realize this end,
they choose to find corporate liability at all.
corporations’ adhesive arbitration agreements “frequently provide
that the arbitrator shall be a current or former manager from the
315
company’s field of business.” Expectedly, consumer efforts to prove
bias and overturn partial arbitrators’ decisions have been met with
judicial opposition, as federal courts have repeatedly held that even
the selection of a manager from a particular industry does not consti316
tute evidence of bias.
This bias and partiality is not only repugnant to the democracy
and impartiality principles underlying our Seventh Amendment
right, but, as they are facilitative of corrupt decision making, they

309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id.
See Lahav, supra note 156, at 593 (citing Weinstein, supra note 306, at 521–23) (explaining
the conflicts of interest present among MDL attorneys and judges).
Id.
Id. (citing Weinstein, supra note 306, at 521–23).
Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684 (1996).
See id. (“Large companies will also attempt to select a decision maker likely to decrease
their likely payout.”).
Id. (citing Bakri v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. CV92-34876 SVW(K), 1992 WL 464125, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1992)).
See id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)).
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stand as measurable impediments to the fair adjudication of victims’
and consumer plaintiffs’ claims.
Furthermore, FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL
are also obstacles to the development of legal and normative contract
and mass tort standards. Legal and normative standards concerning
negligence, evidence, punitive damages, and other issues at play in
contract and mass tort actions, the subject of most FAA-supported arbitral and mass tort MDL actions, develop “based on the experience
317
of trials,” through litigants’ successes and failures before a judge
318
and jury. The loss of contract and mass tort trials stemming from
FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL “removes this
319
However, we
grounding experience, leaving the standards open.”
need trials to ground contracts’ and mass torts’ legal and “normative
standards—to make them sufficiently clear that persons can abide by
320
them in planning their affairs.” Consequently, the repercussions of
321
the absence of trials’ “standard-setting effect[s],” although likely
unseen and intangible today, will result in a profound legal and normative gap tomorrow, largely to the detriment of those consumer and
mass tort plaintiffs fortunate enough to exercise their jury trial right.
Additionally, FAA-supported arbitration agreements and MDL, by
nullifying the threat of an individual or class-based jury trial, also reduce the incentive for corporate defendants to minimize reckless behavior.
Corporate defendants employing adhesive, FAA-supported arbitration agreements or before an MDL court know they do not need
to be concerned with a protracted, public, individual or class-based
trial, which scholars and jurists have found play a vital role in deter322
They can, instead, rest assured knowring corporate wrongdoing.

317
318

319
320
321
322

Patrick Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1419
(2002).
See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 300, at 401–02 (“[L]egal norms need community input
for the decisions applying them to be accepted by that community. Issues such as negligence, intentional discrimination, material breach of contract, and unfair competition
are not facts capable of scientific demonstration . . . . [T]hey are concepts mixing elements of fact and law that become legitimate behavioral norms when the citizenry at
large, acting through jury representatives, decides what the community deems acceptable.”).
Higginbotham, supra note 317, at 1419.
Id. at 1423.
Gross & Syverud, supra note 176, at 4.
See Gilles, supra note 20, at 378 (“[T]he threat of class action liability plays a vital role in
deterring corporate wrongdoing . . . . [S]ound public policy requires collective litigation
be available for small-claim plaintiffs who would not have the incentive or resources
to . . . deter wrongdoing in one-on-one proceedings.” (citing David Rosenberg, Decoupling
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ing that, if victims or consumer plaintiffs seek to hold them responsible, the most they reasonably have to fear is a private settlement. Because arbitration occurs privately and mass tort MDL attorneys cloak
settlement discussions and discovery with comprehensive protective
orders, arbitral and MDL proceedings’ findings are not subject to
public scrutiny, so the public will never know whether the victims’ or
consumer plaintiffs’ allegations are meritorious and whether the de323
fendants truly engaged in reckless, harmful, or illegal behavior,
measurably diminishing corporations’ motivation to curb such behav324
Consequently, not only is the status quo’s absence of trials
ior.
harmful to future plaintiffs, victims, and society at large, but it contravenes a primary principle underlying America’s civil justice system:
our civil justice system seeks not only to compensate the victim, but
325
also to “deter companies from harming in the first place.”
Finally, corporations are able to use adhesive, FAA-supported arbitration agreements as a claim-suppression device, inhibiting consumers from seeking legal adjudication and redress for the wrongful acts
undertaken by corporate defendants. Evidence not only shows that
326
mandatory arbitration stifles consumer plaintiffs’ claims, but also
that FAA-supported adhesive class arbitration waivers, by effectively

323

324

325
326

Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV.
1871, 1906 n.62 (2002))).
See HANNAY, supra note 306, at § 70:15 (“[A]rbitration is a private process. Unlike court
proceedings, arbitration proceedings do not become part of the public record and are
generally not public events.”); Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo?
A Trial Judge’s Lament Over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 116
(2010) (“The time for the public to scrutinize what actually happened in this case is after
the facts have been developed in the process of adversary litigation. Unfortunately, if this
case plays out as most cases do, the public will never know if [litigant’s] sensationalized allegations are true. This is because the attorneys will attempt to shroud discovery in secrecy with a comprehensive protective order and any settlement will likely be kept secret.”
(alteration in original)); Weinstein, supra note 306, at 511 (“[I]t is almost impossible to
settle many mass tort cases without a secrecy agreement.”).
See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES LAW REVIEW § 1.2 (2012) (“[L]itigation helps to
deter corporate misconduct.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678 (1986) (“[O]ur legal system has long accepted, if
somewhat uneasily, the concept of the plaintiff’s attorney as an entrepreneur who performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable conduct.”); Gilles, supra note
27, at 378 (“[S]ound public policy requires collective litigation be available for smallclaim plaintiffs who would not have the incentive or resources to . . . deter wrongdoing in
one-on-one proceedings.” (citing Rosenberg, supra note 322, at 1906 n.62)).
KANNER, supra note 60, at 39.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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barring consumers from securing class actions, serve as perhaps the
327
ultimate, most potent claim-suppression device available.
By banning consumer class actions and funneling consumers into
binding, individual arbitration, class arbitration waivers make disput328
Consumer class acing individual consumer cases uneconomical.
tions are dominated by those cases in which corporations use lowdollar-value rip-offs that engender substantial revenues because they
329
are practiced on a wide scale. However, by prohibiting the aggregation of such low-value claims, adhesive class arbitration waivers produce a reality in which it is uneconomical for individual consumer
plaintiffs to expend the substantial time and resources called for by
an individual arbitration action against a corporate defendant over a
330
As a result, consumers are often compelled to
low-value claim.
331
permit their individual, low-value claims to go entirely unremitted.
This not only forces consumers to internalize the costs stemming
from corporations’ wrongdoing, but, in effect, permits corporations
332
to “simply opt out of exposure to collective litigation,” a result not
only repugnant to the ideals underlying plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury right,
but also one that is “no more defensible than a system in which corporations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to federal an333
titrust, securities, or civil rights laws” at all.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Court’s repeated proclamations deeming plaintiffs’
Seventh Amendment trial-by-jury right “justly dear to the American
334
335
people” and “an object of deep interest and solicitude,” the Court
has, in practice, disregarded this right entirely, as analysis reveals that
it has unconditionally permitted procedures, such as FAA-supported
arbitration agreements and MDL, to compel and coerce consumer
and mass tort plaintiffs into relinquishing their right to trial by jury.

327

328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335

See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 242
(2012) (“Nothing is more claim-suppressing than a ban on class actions, particularly in
cases where the economics of disputing make pursuit of individual cases irrational.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gilles, supra note 27, at 430.
Id.
Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford,
28 U.S. 433, 434 (1830).
Id. (quoting Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446).
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Though the Court has not explicitly approved of either procedure
or the resultant diminution of plaintiffs’ constitutional right, the
Court has rubber-stamped each through its decision to effectively exit
the field of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. Its formalistic, permissive trial-by-jury jurisprudence affords the constitutional right no
meaning, substance, or policy backing, signaling to the public, federal courts, and legislators that plaintiffs’ constitutional right to trial by
jury is not a substantive, consequential protection, but a minor formal
requirement that can be easily overridden by a procedure’s nominal
consistency with the vague notion that it permits the jury some
336
chance at rendering a verdict on “issues of fact.”
The Court’s decision to exit the field of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is a profoundly problematic, untenable one. There are
337
no “exception[s] to the jury trial right.” The jury was not just the
338
“efficient choice of the founders;” the Founders considered the
right to a jury trial to be “a central figure in the administration of jus339
Accordingly, the Framers, whose interpretations the Court
tice.”
ironically claims to honor, recognized the pitfalls of the jury-trial
right, but “nevertheless tenaciously insisted upon its inclusion in the
340
Bill of Rights.” More tangibly, the practical dangers of marginalizing consumer and mass tort plaintiffs’ constitutional trial-by-jury
rights are manifold, as the absence of jury trials threatens the very litigant and societal interests the Seventh Amendment is thought to
protect. Thus, that returning to the field of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence will be a daunting task likely calling for the Court to
overturn several of its past decisions is an unavailing justification for
the Court’s continued failure to adequately define, detail, or protect
plaintiffs’ constitutional right to trial by jury.
Consequently, we—scholars, policymakers, legislators, judges, lawyers, and students alike—cannot remain idle onlookers in the field of
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. Each step we permit the Court
and corporate defendants to take in permitting and employing procedures inconsistent with plaintiffs’ practical ability to be heard by a
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jury is a step toward a judicial administrative method of handling legal disputes, a step toward a system in which the right to a civil jury
trial is not a constitutional right to be exercised by plaintiffs, but a
devalued, neglected relic of the past. As is illustrated by its striking
willingness to accept modern civil procedural innovations’ impacts on
the jury-trial right through its permissive, formalistic Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court is unlikely to affect change in
the absence of an externally supplied impetus to do so. Thus, any
Court-ordered solution to this constitutional dilemma will stem from
our actions—scholars’ critical focus on the tension between modern
civil procedural innovations and plaintiffs’ trial-by-jury rights, policymakers,’ legislators’, and judges’ directives and holdings concerning
plaintiffs’ access to juries, lawyers’ efforts to convince the Courts to
focus and act on this issue, and students’ activism on behalf of those
prospective plaintiffs unable to exercise their constitutional rights.
Accordingly, only by taking such action can we vindicate the continued vitality of the Seventh Amendment and the interests it protects
and ensure that neither FAA-supported arbitration, MDL, nor any
other procedural innovation effectively, as many corporate defendants would certainly like them to, “relegat[e] the Seventh Amend341
ment to insignificant words on a page.”
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